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From the Editor
Welcome to the February 2016 issue of CTX. Much has happened in the CT 
world since our November issue (vol. 5, no. 4) went online. Sadly, radical 
Islamist terrorism remains on the march, with major attacks on civilians in Paris 
and Beirut in November, and with ISIS claiming credit for bringing down a 
Russian passenger plane over Sinai in October. On the second day of the new 
year, Saudi Arabia threw some cheap oil on the flames of its rivalry with Iran 
by executing a prominent Shi’a cleric (along with 47 other people), and the 
two sectarian heavyweights broke off diplomatic relations. Where everybody is 
someone’s enemy, there seem to be few friends.
Most of the articles in this issue, unsurprisingly, have something to do with ISIS. 
Captain Nicholas Dubaz starts us off, however, with some lessons drawn from 
his experiences as an intelligence officer and a civil affairs officer in Afghanistan. 
He describes how US forces can be tempted by technology to substitute quantity 
of information for quality of analysis, which too often leads to bad decision 
making. Shifting the work of intelligence to smaller, innovative edge organiza-
tions may be one solution.
To better understand why US and coalition strategies against ISIS have largely 
failed, Major Wael Abbas delves into the history of al Qaeda and ISIS. The first 
mistake, he points out, was to assume that the two organizations were ideologi-
cally different, which led the opponents of ISIS to underestimate the threat the 
group poses. The second major problem is that many coalition members have 
their own interests in Syria and Iraq and don’t necessarily share the United 
States’ goals for the region.
Major Caleb Slayton offers a heartfelt essay on the importance of familiarity 
with local language and culture for the SOF operator. Drawing on his lifetime of 
experience living and working in various parts of Africa, he describes how he was 
able to gain new insights and deepen his knowledge of local cultures by speaking 
even a few phrases of the local language to his hosts.
Dr. Siamak Naficy and Major Joshua Russo take a look at the human penchant 
to root for the underdog in unequal contests. What characteristics bestow under-
dog status? And is it possible for members of a perceived top dog group—in this 
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case, the Western coalition against ISIS—to use information operations to undermine the “deserving underdog” narrative 
of the opponent?  
The concept of “operations and intelligence fusion” gained importance in Afghanistan as coalition military CT operations 
gave way to Afghan-led policing and criminal justice procedures. Major Awe (a pseudonym) describes a simple analytical 
tool, developed by a small SOF task force, which allowed them and their Afghan police partners to base their operational 
decision making on a clear, customizable intelligence picture.  
Instead of our usual CTAP interview, we bring you a panel discussion in which five CT experts address questions about the 
rise of ISIS, the role ideology plays in its strategy planning, the proper role of the United States and its partners in the fight 
against the group, and how to counter its robust information operations. 
Finally, for the Written Word, Blaire Harms explores a new work by terrorism experts Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, ISIS: 
The State of Terror, in which the authors contend that ISIS is much more than just a bigger, more successful version of 
al Qaeda by closely examining the group’s message, recruitment targets, and use of social media.
You’ll notice we don’t have a film review or an ethics or state of the art column in this issue. That’s because you didn’t write 
one for us. Did you see a movie about terrorism or insurgency that got you thinking? Have you faced a moral dilemma in 
the course of your duties that your fellow operators might be able to learn from, or that you’re still looking for answers to? 
Are you creating works of art to help you express your feelings about what you’ve experienced? Contact me at the email 
address below, and let’s talk. Or you can go ahead and send us what you have, and we’ll consider it for publication.
As always, we present some of the latest publications from the Joint Special Operations University in our Publications 
Announcements. We welcome your letters and comments at CTXeditor@GlobalEcco.org. Keep up on global CT news 
and comment on articles by “liking” Global ECCO on Facebook. If you are interested in submitting an article for possible 
publication, send it to CTXSubmit@GlobalEcco.org.
May this new year bring peace to everyone, everywhere. May every angry heart be soothed, may every hungry belly be 
filled, may every grief and fear find solace.
ELIZABETH SKINNER
Managing Editor, CTX 
CTXEditor@globalecco.org
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Analysis from the Edge: Information 
Paralysis and Decision Making in Complexity
CPT Nicholas R. Dubaz, US Army
Throughout the last 13 years of military conflict involving 
US forces, commanders, planners, and civilian decision makers at all levels have 
demonstrated an unquenchable thirst for information. Individuals and units 
have had to respond to multilayered requirements for the collection of informa-
tion, and dozens of new information-processing tools and systems have been 
deployed to capture the resulting data. The small civil affairs community alone 
uses at least seven different, often competing and non-interoperable, systems for 
civil reconnaissance and information management. The much larger intelligence 
community, tasked with integrating and analyzing vast amounts of data, uses 
hundreds of such systems. Most of these systems utilize an event-based, database-
enabled ontology in which the human world operates like an engineered machine 
in accordance with Newtonian physics and modernist philosophy. As a result, 
such tools, and the people who depend on them, are ill-equipped to grapple with 
the complex conflicts of the twenty-first century. 
Despite an ever-increasing volume of information, we are arguably less capable 
than ever of dealing with a world composed of complex adaptive systems charac-
terized by their unbounded nature, diversity, and nonlinearity. Indeed, small SOF 
elements, like their conventional counterparts, are currently bound by processes 
and models that, in their attempts to provide clarity to the environment, lead 
only to further confusion. Thirteen years of counterinsurgency operations in 
Afghanistan have demonstrated the peril inherent in this information overload, 
as well as the potential of small special operations elements to enable the military 
to move beyond our failed approaches and reach understanding amid com-
plexity.1 In doing so, commanders and staff, as consumers of information and 
intelligence, can be freed from reductionist ways of thinking and focus instead 
on developing the situational awareness that will help them adapt strategies and 
achieve operational objectives.
Network-Centric Warfare
In recent decades, the explosion in information technology’s capabilities, and 
its increasing availability and application at the tactical level, have promised a 
revolution in command and control for every echelon of the military. Recent 
attempts at doctrinal innovation have largely centered on the core problems of 
the complexity of modern operational environments, the potential and peril 
of an “informatized” battlefield, and the indefinite nature of the problems 
our armed forces are being asked to address on a global scale. The concept of 
effects-based operations (EBO), in its various forms, is among the most famous 
of these attempts. EBO, however, became entangled with reductionist thinking 
and promised—through system-of-systems analysis and operational net assess-
ment—much more than it could possibly deliver. A revolutionary capability in 
theory, EBO was supposed to enable information dominance and swift decision 
making to overwhelm and paralyze an adversary, resulting in his rapid, decisive 
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defeat.2 Instead, its users are the ones who have found themselves paralyzed by an 
onslaught of mostly disordered information. 
Though the concept of fog and friction in warfare has been widely known and un-
derstood among military professionals since time immemorial, its implications 
are best expressed by strategist Carl von Clausewitz in his nineteenth-century 
treatise On War.3 As he puts it, “Everything in war is simple, but the simplest 
thing is difficult.” 4 Chance events and the sheer difficulty of an endeavor so 
intrinsic to human nature coalesce into a fog of unpredictability that has covered 
every battlefield in human history. For Clausewitz, it was the commander and 
his experience that served as the “oil capable of diminishing this friction.”5 In the 
twenty-first century, however, military theorists have sought to burn through the 
fog of war and eliminate the friction by means of information superiority and 
networked military organizations. 
As early as 1970, before the internet and mobile technology became mainstream, 
futurist and sociologist Alvin Toffler described what he saw as the coming age 
of information overload and its dangerous implications.6 The increasing pace of 
change, including rapid advancements in communication technology and faster 
means of transportation, was producing “decision stress” and “sensory overstimu-
lation,” according to Toffler’s book Future Shock.7 This perceived loss of control 
was resulting in cognitive withdrawal, decision paralysis, and the inability to 
properly use information.8 Future Shock and several other works in which Toffler 
and his wife Heidi Adelaide Toffler outlined their ideas about the future of 
society proved highly influential in the development of new thinking as military 
strategists attempted to address the effects of overabundant information on the 
battlefield. Other thinkers, both inside and outside the military, have looked for 
ways to channel the rapid pace of change and the increasing flow of information 
into military success. 
Network-centric warfare, as this new form of information-enabled warfare came 
to be known, has many parents and nearly as many interpretations. The ideas and 
writings of the late Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski are particularly influen-
tial. Cebrowski, inspired by Air Force Colonel John Boyd’s theories of decision 
making in aerial combat, postulated that it was not information superiority 
alone that translated into victory, but the ability to transform that information 
into “action and behavior options” faster and more accurately than an oppo-
nent.9 Unlike others in the network-centric warfare community who believed 
that technology alone would guarantee information superiority, Cebrowski 
understood that effectiveness was less about technology and more about infor-
mation management: shared perspectives and perceptions would enable the 
military to better utilize the information at hand.10 In other words, “information 
superiority required more than simply knowing a lot. It required knowing more 
of the right things, accurately and in time to act.”11 
In the decades since Cebrowski identified the problem, modern militaries 
nevertheless have only moved further away from a solution. We are bombarded 
with more and more data but develop less and less understanding. Something 
is missing—something that ties the information together and renders it mean-




Information Paralysis or Analytical Malfeasance?
Few fields within the military manage a greater volume of raw data and informa-
tion than signals intelligence. The supply of metadata, databases, tools, analytical 
methods, and systems available to analysts seeking every “piece of the puzzle” is 
virtually endless. According to a 2011 New York Times article, 1,600 percent more 
data has become available to all levels of the military since 11 September 2001.12 
With the increases in signals intelligence technology and adaptation to modern in-
formation communication technologies, the data available to intelligence analysts 
increased by orders of magnitude compared with the general military forces. The 
outcome of this explosion in the volume and accessibility of information, however, 
is a flawed sense of understanding as nearly every echelon conducts its own analysis 
of the same databases through the filter of its own particular slant or interest. 
Chechen Ghosts
On my first tour in Afghanistan from May 2007 to August 2008, an issue of 
particular interest at the division (Regional Command-East [RC-East]) and the-
ater (International Security Assistance Force [ISAF]) levels was “foreign fighter” 
support to the Taliban and al Qaeda. The priority intelligence requirements 
of the RC-East commander, along with nearly every RC-East Joint Intelligence 
Support Element (JISE) analytical product, focused to some extent on the foreign 
fighter issue. On one occasion, the JISE used information from a particular 
database to produce a map of a supposed Chechen presence along the Afghan-
Pakistan border in Kunar, Nuristan, and Nangarhar provinces. While there is no 
public evidence of post–Taliban-era Chechen fighters in Afghanistan, rumors 
of their existence consistently find their way into both intelligence and open 
source reporting.13 The reputation of Chechens as fearless fighters and capable 
leaders, combined with both the presence of lighter skinned, Caucasian-looking 
individuals on the battlefield and circular reporting by inexperienced human 
intelligence collectors, have contributed to such rumors, provoking an unwar-
ranted special interest in Chechens among US military commanders and staffs. 
This particular map, which indicated that there was an extensive Chechen pres-
ence across eastern Afghanistan, was briefed at a nightly commander’s update. 
The commanding general immediately requested additional information from 
the brigade commander responsible for this area, and the brigade commander, 
caught off guard, turned to his intelligence officer demanding to know how 
such an extensive Chechen presence could have been missed by his own intel-
ligence staff. Upon hearing of this incident from the Brigade S-2, I attempted 
to corroborate the map and analysis produced by the JISE. Using the same tools 
and database, I queried all references to “Chechens” in the same geographical 
region and produced an identical map. A deeper look at the underlying data and 
geographic information system software the analyst used to produce the original 
map, however, revealed that any connection to Chechens was completely spe-
cious. Another source was an internal Afghan National Army report, which said 
that American advisors had discussed the possible presence of Chechens. In most 
instances, the record behind the data point explicitly excluded the possibility of a 
Chechen presence. 
In the end, not a single report associated with the map could be interpreted 
as evidence that Chechens were in eastern Afghanistan. But even if some of 
BUT LESS 
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the data points had proved relevant, there remains the 
absurdity of accepting, without question, the existence of 
an extensive network of Chechens operating as a highly 
insular insurgent group on the Afghan-Pakistani frontier 
and then sharing it as intelligence in a routine com-
mander’s update. 
On another occasion, a different analytical section nearly 
persuaded a commander to conduct a direct action opera-
tion on a public call office—a telephone in a storefront, 
something quite common in Afghanistan and other 
developing countries—because the analysts interpreted the 
activity of the telephone’s hundreds of users to indicate that 
the office was a key actor in multiple insurgent networks. 
On the surface, these appear to be simply stories of lazy 
analysts who could not be bothered to follow even the most 
basic procedures of intelligence analysis, or of commanders 
seeking to micromanage their units. These are, however, 
just a few examples among many similar ones that arose 
throughout my many months of service in Afghanistan as 
an intelligence officer and my additional 
tours as a civil affairs officer. 
The same problems manifested at the 
division, ISAF Joint Command, and 
ISAF headquarters levels, as well as in the 
various special operations intelligence 
headquarters. Clearly, the problem was 
more than just an ineffective and poorly 
trained and led intelligence team. In 
fact, as an intelligence officer, I estimate 
that I spent well over half of my time and analytical energy 
preventing others from making operational mistakes 
based on flawed understanding gained in an environment 
of information paralysis. Intelligence sections at the 
division, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, 
and higher headquarters levels simply did what they knew 
best: pulling records from databases, placing dots on 
maps, and claiming insight. More information, paradoxi-
cally, meant shallower analysis: they had all the informa-
tion in the world, but no context in which to apply it.14 
Edge Organizations and Constrained 
Organizations
These intelligence analysis sections failed largely because 
they were situated in highly modernist organizations that 
are poorly suited to the task of effectively using all that 
information to which they have access. Modernism, in this 
sense, is a philosophy that maintains that all problems 
can be solved (progressivism); that all causal relationships 
are knowable (logical positivism); that variables can be 
separated (reductionism); and, finally, that data can 
provide evidence of truth (empiricism).15 Linearity, which 
assumes the proportionality, additivity, replication, and 
demonstrability of causes and effects, is embedded in this 
philosophy, and to a certain extent in human nature.16 
Within this flawed modernist structure, databases con-
tinue to be the military’s primary method of categorizing 
information and attempting to share it across echelons 
to capitalize on the theorized promise of information 
superiority.
In Afghanistan, there are dozens of databases for intelli-
gence and operational information that sit on no less than 
eight discrete networks operating at multiple classification 
and access restriction levels. Analytical sections at each 
echelon within the rigid hierarchical military structure 
pull records from these databases and attempt to recon-
struct understanding, as if the whole of knowledge could 
be assembled from the parts contained in the database. 
These event-driven, database-focused processes assume 
that the world operates by the linear 
principle of additivity—that is, the 
whole is equal to the sum of its parts.17 
According to Thomas Czerwinski, 
writing in an early study of non-
linearity in warfare, “This promotes and 
legitimizes reductionism, the practice of 
taking a complicated and large problem 
and breaking it into more manageable 
pieces, analyzing the constituent parts, 
and arriving at a conclusion.”18 We 
know, however, that the problems our military forces are 
being asked to address are non-linear in nature and cannot 
be understood in pieces pulled from database records. 
Power to the Edge, a study of new forms of military orga-
nization, command, and control for structurally complex, 
nonlinear, network-centric warfare, proposes a new type 
of organizational design known as an edge organization.19 
Edge organizations are so named because they operate at 
the “edge” of a theoretical command-and-control space 
that is diametrically opposite to traditional military orga-
nizations. That edge, depicted in figures 1 and 2, is one of 
unconstrained interaction, devolved decision making, and 
broad information access and dissemination.20 Figure 1 
illustrates the distinction between the information sharing 
and control paradigms of edge organizations, which 
interact freely with all actors and operate on a trust-based 
model, and the traditional control-based model of hierar-
chical military organizations. Figure 2 illustrates the shift 
in operational context from the well-structured problems 
posed by the state-on-state confrontations of the Cold 
EDGE ORGANIZATIONS 
INTERACT FREELY 
AMONG ALL ACTORS 




War era, for which many modern militaries were designed, to the highly 
unstructured “wicked” problems presented by the fluid conflicts of the 
present. While edge organizations struggle with certain weaknesses, par-
ticularly inefficiencies in bureaucratized, familiar, routine processes, they 
are more agile than other types of organizations.21 Most critically, as the 
authors of the concept note, “Edge organizations are particularly well 
suited to deal with uncertainty and unfamiliarity, because they make 
more of their relevant knowledge, experience, and expertise available.” 22
For a military organization, power and effectiveness are “a function of 
the collective means and opportunity possessed by the individuals in the 
organization with respect to their ability to accomplish the … minimum 
essential capabilities required for military operations.” 25 Chief among 
these capabilities is sensemaking, the ability to understand the funda-
mental nature of a problem the organization is tasked with addressing.26 
Edge organizations are uniquely situated to develop understanding, 
with their unconstrained ability to engage all actors in a system and 
achieve information superiority. While no US Department of Defense 
organization lives up to the idealized model of an edge organization, 
small SOF units exhibit many of the edge characteristics. However 
capable these organizations may be at a tactical level, the knowledge 
and information processes and procedures of the US military, including 
SOF headquarters, nevertheless are not optimized to take advantage of 
special operations units’ ability to develop understanding and inform 
adaptive decision making at the operational and strategic levels. 
The 2010 report Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence 
Relevant in Afghanistan, authored in part by then–ISAF chief of intel-
ligence Major General Michael Flynn and commonly known as the 
“Flynn report,” is an influential and oft-cited response to some of the 
well-documented failings of intelligence in Afghanistan. The report, 
from the Center for a New American Security, has many recom-
mendations but is at its core an attempt to produce better intelligence 
through “select teams of analysts … empowered to move between field 
elements, much like journalists, to visit collectors of information at the 
grassroots level and carry that information back with them to the regional com-
mand level.” 27 The purpose of this approach was to help deemphasize analysis 
that focused solely on the enemy and instead foster a holistic appraisal of the 
operational environment—something that was absent at all levels of analysis. 
Other academic approaches to information overload and poor-quality analysis 
recommend technical and organizational adaptations such as the “pre-processing 
of most physical sensor data and displaying the processed data as information in 
a variety of formats and media,” or “assisting in the identification of source per-
spectives and bias.” 28 Despite the fact that the Flynn report correctly identified a 
problem, the transformed analytical enterprise described in the report’s recom-
mendations still addresses a human problem through marginal organizational 
adaptations and leaves the fundamental obstacle intact: analysts using fragments 
of information to conduct analysis without the necessary context. 
Analysis from the Edge in Afghanistan
The 2014 presidential elections in Afghanistan were to be the ultimate test of 
the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) following the 
 SMALL SOF UNITS 
EXHIBIT MANY 
OF THE EDGE 
CHARACTERISTICS.
Figure 1: Command and Control Approach
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Figure 2: Command and Control Problem Space
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transition of security responsibilities from ISAF. ISAF was present in fewer loca-
tions across Afghanistan than at any time since the early days of the conflict. No 
longer would US military power be on call to support the ANSF in combat, and 
no longer would Afghan government ministries have access to coalition funds 
or equipment for tasks they could—or should—accomplish on their own. The 
decisive nature of the elections and the highly risk-averse tendencies of coalition 
military commanders meant, however, that ISAF forces would not allow the 
ANSF to fail if the Afghans had exhausted—or believed they had exhausted—all 
internal means to deal with problems. This, in turn, required the establishment 
of an elaborate system for identifying potential failures and responding rapidly 
to shortfalls. 
The data demands of the various echelons of the ISAF hierarchy and the US State 
Department were immense, covering nearly every aspect of the election process 
down to the polling station level. In just the small province of Khost, informa-
tion was to be gathered and processed by Afghanistan’s independent election 
commission at 729 polling stations before the election and in real time during 
both the polling itself and the ballot recovery process. Dozens of spreadsheets 
were to be completed, and multiple reports had to be submitted on a weekly 
or event-driven basis. ISAF headquarters required unnecessarily detailed 
information on security force disposition, as well as ballot recovery routes and 
methods, while the State Department had an insatiable thirst for every piece of 
information related to female voters, female candidates, and election observers. 
The security transition, combined with pervasive risk-aversion and force reduc-
tions, meant, however, that these operations had to be conducted in a highly 
constrained environment where getting access to the required information 
was more difficult than ever. Neither US nor coalition military forces would 
directly observe the election, or have access to the government facilities where 
the election administrators were located, as they had in previous elections. It was 
necessary, therefore, to find new means to develop situational understanding 
during the election.
A standard organization, operating in a traditional, highly constrained command 
and control environment, would find itself unable to deal with such obstacles. 
My civil affairs team, however, were able to leverage our position as an edge 
organization to overcome the constraints. Working horizontally, we immersed 
ourselves in the Afghan National 
Army unit we were tasked to advise 
and, in conjunction with our Afghan 
counterparts, began to build networks 
of trust among the provincial and 
district governments through careful 
joint planning, rehearsals, and informal 
relationship building in the months 
approaching the election. We also de-
veloped close relationships with several 
highly connected non-governmental 
organizations across the province by 
offering to share information, coordi-
nate efforts, and address their concerns 
while drawing on their local experience 
and knowledge. Most critically, we 




directly engaged with many highly respected leaders in the province, holding 
regular meetings with the chairmen of influential religious scholars’, peace, and 
veterans’ councils. Vertically, we connected with relevant individuals within the 
State Department and advisors in the ministries in Kabul, as well as non-gov-
ernmental and international organizations across the regions, thus maintaining 
open communication outside the traditional hierarchies. 
Outside of these formal networks, we developed extensive social media contacts 
and closely followed both the formal and social electronic media environment 
within and around the province. The extensive cellular network that extended 
even into areas of near-total Haqqani or Taliban control, along with the region’s 
growing internet penetration, gave us access to previously denied areas of the 
province and allowed us to gather near real-time information from a significant 
new portion of the population. 
Our success was made possible because we understood our status as an edge 
organization and were able to aggregate information and experience through ex-
tended, flattened networks of trust. Although we operated, technically speaking, 
within a traditional hierarchy as a team attached to a military organization, our 
position as the only element dedicated to engaging the civil component of the 
operational environment allowed us to expand our approach to the problem. We 
were able, moreover, to assist our Afghan counterparts in operating as an edge 
organization themselves. Already situated in their own country and comfortable 
within the shared culture and language, they had far more ability than we ever 
would to develop situational understanding and networks of trust beyond the 
walls of their bases.
In the days leading up to the election and on election day itself, our network 
offered real-time access to information across the province, and our experience 
informed decision making at multiple levels through a credible understanding 
of the environment. While we could not know everything, we also knew that 
we didn’t need to; our network and experience enabled us to discern exactly 
what information was important and what was not. Time after time, we refuted 
erroneous reports from higher echelons and external reporting agencies, thereby 
preventing unnecessary and potentially dangerous coalition intervention in what 
had to be a purely Afghan process. Most importantly, we conducted analysis 
from the edge, combining our experience with the combined knowledge of our 
trust network to provide reliable information, analyzed in context, to decision 
makers as they needed it. 
Conclusion
The aim of achieving information superiority in warfare is to both find clarity 
within a complex operational environment and enable commanders to guide the 
disparate elements that must work in concert to achieve operational objectives. 
Current military processes do not provide commanders and staffs with the tools 
and conceptual frameworks they need to operate effectively in a complex and 
dynamic world. To the contrary, standard information processing, analysis, and 
“sensemaking” arise from modernist and linear thinking, which not only lead 
us further from clarity but promise to reveal causal relationships that are in fact 
unknowable.  
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At the conclusion of Book 1 of On War, Clausewitz compares the value of expe-
rience to the human eye in a dark room: as it “dilates its pupil, draws in the little 
light there is, by degrees imperfectly distinguishes objects and at last sees them 
quite accurately, so it is in war with the experienced soldier, while the novice 
only encounters pitch-dark night.” 29 Analysis from the edge, like the pupil of the 
eye, can aid military forces to see through the darkness of a complex and non-
linear era of competition and conflict. There will be many eyes on the battlefields 
of the present and future, in the form of small special operations units. The 
persistent challenge is to develop effective processes and systems that can capture 
these units’ understanding of ambiguous operational environments and use it to 
inform operational and strategic decision making. ²
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The US-Led Coalition against ISIS: Strategic 
Difficulties and Political Will
MAJ Wael Abbas,  
Lebanese Armed Forces
The latest terrorist attacks by the violent extremist group 
calling itself the “Islamic State,” aka ISIS, which hit Paris and Beirut in November 
2015, have initiated a new wave of arguments about the effectiveness of the strategy 
pursued by the US-led coalition to fight the terrorist organization. These successful 
attacks underscore the fact that more than a year after the creation of the coalition, 
ISIS has not only proven its resilience, but has also demonstrated the ability to 
enhance its capabilities, widen its operational reach, and increase its international 
influence enough to threaten Western countries with effective terrorist attacks. 
The tendency to underestimate ISIS arises from a misunderstanding of its ide-
ology and the misconception that the extremists present only a regional threat. 
These mistaken views have influenced the level of commitment to the fight 
demonstrated by the United States and its allies, and is one reason for the failure 
of the strategy adopted by the United States and its coalition allies to achieve 
decisive victories. 
The Rise of the “Caliphate”
In the aftermath of its sudden military successes in Syria and Iraq, the violent 
jihadist organization known as “al Qaeda in Iraq” (AQI) declared a caliphate 
under the name of the “Islamic State” in early summer 2014. When the group’s 








A boy poses while showing 
one of the fake U.S. 100 
dollar banknotes dropped by 
Syrian army jets in the Douma 
neighborhood of Damascus. The 
note depicts the Islamic State’s 
leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
and al-Nusra Front’s leader Abu 
Mohammed al-Joulani.
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in Mosul to lead prayers on the first Friday of Ramadan (4 July 2014), he publicly 
assumed the title of Caliph—the political and religious leader of all Muslims.1 
The terrorist organization had originally formed as Jama’at al-Tawhid wal Jihad 
under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, several years before the 2003 American invasion 
of Iraq. It was renamed al Qaeda in Iraq after al-Zarqawi declared allegiance to al 
Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden, in October 2004. Al-Zarqawi was killed by a 
coalition air strike in June 2006, and in October, AQI joined with other jihadist 
groups to form the “Islamic State of Iraq” (ISI) under the leadership of an Iraqi, 
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. ISI kept its allegiance to al Qaeda. 
During that period, the US Joint Special Operations Command developed a 
network of special forces groups to fight the insurgencies, mainly ISI, in north-
western Iraq.2 The United States also had an important role in the formation of 
the Sunni Sahwa (Awakening) councils in Diyala and Anbar provinces, which 
were able to expel ISI from the region in 2007.3 The US strategy resulted in the 
death or capture of thousands of insurgents during that period, but the biggest 
setback for ISI came in April 2010, when Iraqi and American forces killed ISI’s top 
two leaders, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri.4 The new leader, 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, inherited an organization in desperate condition.
The start of the Syrian uprising in March 2011 presented an opportunity for ISI 
to recover. Within the first year, the Syrian regime lost control over many areas 
of the country, especially in northern Syria. ISI, which was still part of al Qaeda, 
started sending fighters to Syria under the leadership of Abu Mohammad al-Julani.5 These militants, calling their organiza-
tion Jabhat al-Nusra, increased their numbers and military capabilities by recruiting Syrian civilians from their areas of 
control along with defectors from the Syrian army. On 9 April 2013, al-Baghdadi announced the merging of ISI and Jabhat 
al-Nusra under the name of the “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL or ISIS).6 In a statement issued the next day, 
however, al-Julani rejected this merger and reaffirmed his allegiance to al Qaeda and its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who 
declared that ISIS was created without his permission and that ISI and al-Nusra would continue to work separately under 
al Qaeda’s control. Al Qaeda publicly renounced any ties with ISIS in February 2014.7 During that period, ISIS continued 
its expansion by recruiting new fighters and integrating other jihadi groups, including some that split from al-Nusra.8 On 
Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri  
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A US soldier replaces an old photo with a newer image showing the body of Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi (June 2008).
 Iraqi Finance Minister al-Issawi attends 




1 January 2014, ISIS re-invaded the Iraqi city of Fallujah 
from across the Syrian border, and by June, it had dra-
matically expanded its control to Mosul without much 
resistance from the Iraqi Army.9 
What caused this dramatic collapse on the Iraqi front? 
In retrospect, after the final American withdrawal from 
Iraq in December 2011, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s 
government failed to maintain the Sunni support it 
had gained from the Sahwa councils. The government’s 
policies were regarded by most Iraqi Sunnis as sectarian, 
authoritarian, and aimed at politically targeting and 
marginalizing them.10 In December 2012, following the 
arrest of the bodyguards of the Sunni finance minister 
Rafi al-Issawi, protests started in Anbar and then spread to 
many Sunni areas in Ninewa, Kirkuk, Diyala, and parts of 
Baghdad. The protests remained generally peaceful until 
Iraqi security forces attacked a protest camp in Huwija, 
killing 20 protestors. This incident caused a shift towards 
more violent protests in most Sunni provinces, including 
calls for armed resistance. On 30 December 2013, Iraqi 
forces tried to clear a protest camp in Ramadi in the 
aftermath of an attack that killed 24 Iraqi officers in the 
Horan valley. This resulted in further violent confronta-
tions, which forced al-Maliki to promise the withdrawal of 
Iraqi forces from Ramadi and Fallujah. Consequently, ISIS 
was able to reinvade Fallujah with relative impunity. In 
other words, the Sunni Awakening that helped defeat ISI 
in 2007 and 2008 enabled the rise of ISIS in 2013 and 2014, 
as Sunni Iraqis revolted against al-Maliki and the apparent 
excesses of the Iraqi security forces.
The decline of al Qaeda has also contributed to the rise 
of ISIS. Before 2011, the decline resulted mainly from the 
arrests and assassinations of many of al Qaeda’s operational 
leaders; the defeat of al Qaeda franchises in Saudi Arabia, 
Iraq, and Algeria; and other setbacks, including the need 
for the group to defend its reputation and actions to 
Muslims.11 Moreover, al Qaeda’s main leaders had to take 
extreme security measures to protect themselves from 
being traced and killed, which forced them to limit their 
movements and communications and reduced their ability 
to manage and control the organization and its affiliates.12 
After the assassination of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 
and the declaration of al-Zawahiri as the new leader of 
al Qaeda, the weakness became more apparent. Many 
questioned al-Zawahiri’s ability to control the organiza-
tion and maintain its unity, especially after his failure to 
resolve the disputes between al-Nusra and ISIS.13 Others 
considered al-Zawahiri to lack the charisma to influence 
new groups and increase recruitment.14 
Thus, the rise of the Islamic State has three main causes:
1. The new Sunni uprising against what many 
perceived to be deliberate marginalization and 
political targeting by an overtly sectarian Iraqi 
government under Nouri al-Maliki, combined with 
the surprising incompetence of the Iraqi Army;15
2. The opportunity for infiltration by radical groups 
that the Syrian conflict offered after 2011, and the 
unlimited and unconditional support that many 
regional countries gave to a fragmented Syrian 
opposition increasingly dominated by Islamist 
militants (the number of Salafi-jihadist groups 
increased by 58 percent from 2010 to 2013);16 and 
3. The decline of al Qaeda and Ayman al-Zawahiri’s 
failure to be an effective and powerful replacement 
for bin Laden—especially his inability to prevent 
fissures in his organization.
An Ideological Comparison between ISIS 
and Al Qaeda
Reflecting on the events that led to the declaration of the 
caliphate in July 2014, it is clear that the success of ISIS has 
been the result of tactical and strategic choices in which 
religion and ideology had minor roles. In an October 2014 
report, the UN Security Council considered al Qaeda and 
ISIS to be fairly harmonious in their ideology and stated 
that the “al-Qaeda core and [ISIS] pursue similar strategic 
goals, albeit with tactical differences regarding sequencing 
and substantive differences about leadership.”17 As was dis-
cussed earlier, none of the statements issued by al-Nusra, 
ISIS, and al-Zawahiri in the dispute over the declaration of 
ISIS showed any ideological friction. Moreover, even the 
apparent differences between ISIS and al Qaeda on many 
levels—political, military, and public—are purely strategic 
and tactical and are not based on ideology. This similarity 
in ideology is important because it shows that even if the 
regional and sectarian strategies initially pursued by ISIS 
differ from those of al Qaeda, policy makers should not un-
derestimate ISIS’s threat or be surprised by its latest actions 
(the downing of a Russian plane above Sinai on 31 October 
2015, the suicide bombings in Beirut on 12 November 2015, 
and the attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015), which show 
that ISIS strategists are able to shift between regional and 
global jihad and benefit from the support of networks that 
were previously related to al Qaeda.
Even if ISIS seems to exceed al Qaeda with its use of 
extreme violence and brutality, especially in the posting of 
high quality videos on various media that show hostages 
being viciously beheaded or burned alive, this remains 
within the context of strategic rather than ideological 
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differences between the two organizations. The shocking violence used by ISIS 
can be traced back to the days of ISI’s founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was a 
major advocate of violent attacks against civilians of other sects, especially against 
the Shi’a population in Iraq. Although disputes among jihadist and other Islamic 
scholars over the extreme use of violence and the killing of civilians were based on 
ideology, these disputes had a more strategic context between al Qaeda leaders and 
al-Zarqawi. While al-Zarqawi did not differ from other al Qaeda leaders, including 
al-Zawahiri, in his view of Shi’a as unbelievers and heretics, he differed on the 
strategic effectiveness of attacks against the Shi’a community. On the one hand, 
al-Zarqawi defended the use of suicide bombings against the Shi’a because he saw 
them as a necessary tactic to unify the Sunnis. On the other hand, al-Zawahiri 
considered “these attacks, even if permissible from a jurisprudential viewpoint,” 
to have had a negative effect on Muslim public support and the general image of 
Islam. Al-Zawahiri also argued that the attacks against the Shi’a diverted attention 
from the main enemy—the United States—and opened too many fronts.18
Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and the Roots of Extremism
As noted earlier, ISIS’s split from al Qaeda was not based on ideological differ-
ences—even the declaration of an “Islamic State” does not represent an important 
ideological difference between the two groups. This can be better explained by dis-
cussing the caliphate from the religious perspectives of Wahhabism and Salafism.
The Arabic term salaf (ancient one) refers to the first three generations of fol-
lowers of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions (al-salaf al-salih)—the 
original Muslims. Until recently, Salafist teachings were fundamentalist and 
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non-violent, focusing on the need to return to Islam’s root texts while rejecting 
modern relativism.19 Although Wahhabis—adherents to the fundamentalist 
theological movement founded by the Sunni cleric Muhammad ibn ‘Abd 
al-Wahhab (1703–1792)—consider themselves to be true Salafists, other Muslims 
identify them by their Wahhabist ideology.20 Wahhabis share several Salafist 
beliefs, including the rejection of common Muslim practices—such as instituting 
schools of Islamic jurisprudence and the practice of visiting tombs and shrines—
as innovative and polytheistic. More importantly, both sects believe that other 
Muslims have lost the true path and are living in a state of ignorance similar to 
pre-Islam (jahiliyya). 
Wahhabism and Salafism differ, however, in their political views and their view 
of the ruling imam. On the one hand, ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab called on Arabs to 
fight the Ottoman Caliphate and form an independent state, and consequently 
legitimized rebellion against the legal imam. On the other hand, the Salafist 
ideology is apolitical in nature, and its adherents follow the doctrine of al-wala’ 
wal-bara’ (loyalty towards the Prophet and prevention of heresy and unbelief ). 
For this reason, Salafists have preferred to live in sequestered communities where 
they are protected from innovation and corruption. Traditional Salafists also 
reject the oath of allegiance (bay’a) to a temporal ruler for fear that this leader 
might commit sinful acts. This contradicts al Qaeda’s declaration of allegiance to 
the “commander of the faithful” and ISIS’s allegiance to a caliph. 
Earlier Salafists argued that Muslims should not revolt against their rulers even if 
those rulers were unjust, and clearly considered the creation of an Islamic state to 
be unnecessary.21 The Wahhabist roots of their modern jihadist religious ide-
ology, however, have given these groups a different point of view.22 Images and 
videos that were released from areas under ISIS control clearly show the leaders’ 
commitment to the Wahhabist notion of a caliphate, while the schools that they 
opened in Syria used Wahhabi religious books from Saudi Arabia. Other videos 
showed Wahhabi texts in an official ISIS missionary van.23 Moreover, while 
al-Baghdadi has relied on former Iraqi officers for military operations, he leaves 
areas like religious guidance and media production to non-Iraqis, including 
many Saudis.24 Other Saudis were appointed as judges, including all of the twelve 
judges that were appointed in the Syrian city of ar-Raqqa in November 2014.25
As for al Qaeda, even though bin Laden was probably affected by the ideologies 
of Sayyid Qutb and Abdullah Azzam, he nevertheless followed a path of jihad 
that differentiated him from both of them.26 While Qutb spread an anti-
American narrative, he did not call for fighting the United States.27 Moreover, 
al-Zawahiri, who was a true follower of Qutb, failed to influence bin Laden’s 
ideologies and was accused by his former companions in the al-Jihad organiza-
tion of following bin Laden rather than the reverse. Azzam probably mentored 
bin Laden and convinced him to follow the path of jihad, but there is no 
evidence that Azzam influenced bin Laden’s religious beliefs. On the contrary, 
while Azzam rejected attacking Muslims and opposed targeting noncombatants 
as a tool of war, bin Laden issued a fatwa in 1998 that called for the killing of all 
Americans, regardless of their religion. In addition, bin Laden accused the Saudi 
king of being an apostate and called for a war against the Saudi regime.
Signaling their ideological link to Wahhabism, some Saudi clerics agreed with 
bin Laden that the US attack on Iraq in 1991, launched from Saudi Arabia, vio-
lated their belief that non-Muslim troops must never enter Saudi Arabia.28 Saudi 
THE SCHOOLS ISIS 
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USED WAHHABI 
RELIGIOUS BOOKS 
FROM SAUDI ARABIA.  
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clerics also hesitated to denounce the creation of an “Islamic state” after it was 
declared by ISIS in June 2014, and the Saudi king had to publicly urge them to do 
so.29 In 2001, bin Laden “called on Muslims everywhere to come to Afghanistan 
and engage in the jihad led by the ‘commander of the faithful,’ Mullah Muhammad 
Omar.”30 The title “commander of the faithful” was specifically given to the first 
four caliphs in Islam. This was similar to the call of ISIS spokesman Abu Mu-
hammad al-Adnani for all Muslims to vow allegiance to the “caliph” Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi and join the troops of the Islamic State.31 He, like bin Laden in 1998, 
also called for the killing of all Americans, military or civilians.32 
The two organizations are similarly disparaging of other Sunni Islamic groups, 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and political participation in general. After 
the Egyptian army overthrew Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi, a member of 
the Islamic Brotherhood, in 2013, ISIS declared that Islamists should choose “the 
ammunition boxes over the ballot boxes” and called the Muslim Brotherhood “a 
secular party in Islamic clothes.”33 Similarly, al Qaeda viewed elections as heresy 
and preached that only violence could achieve political change.34 While some 
scholars consider these ideas to be part of Salafism in general, others specifically 
relate them to Wahhabi ideology.
By revolting against those they consider to be unjust rulers and waging war 
against unbelievers, both ISIS and al Qaeda follow the teachings of original Wah-
habism. The religious educational system adopted by many Saudi clerics, based 
on the teachings of ‘Abd al-Wahhab, will probably continue to produce radical 
Islamists similar to the leaders of al Qaeda and ISIS. Moreover, the declaration 
of an Islamic state and vows of allegiance to a religious leader are specifically 
related to Wahhabism and not to any other Salafist group, which would indi-
cate that both ISIS and al Qaeda have been loyal to their Wahhabi ideologies. 
Consequently, the tendency of the United States and its allies to regard ISIS as a 
regional problem caused by the sectarian conflicts in Syria and Iraq, rather than 
as a threat comparable to al Qaeda, is far from realistic and is one of the reasons 
that Western strategies to fight ISIS have proven inadequate. The similarities in 
the ideologies of ISIS and al Qaeda explain their similar strategies, including the 
use of extreme violence, targeting of civilians, and global jihad. 
ISIS: From Regional Strategies to Global Jihad
While al Qaeda focused on global jihad from its earliest days, ISIS “pursued 
a strategy of establishing and consolidating a political entity in regions where 
the former state no longer functions or can be expelled. It is in this respect a 
fundamentally political rather than religious project.”35 ISIS initially focused 
on controlling territories that could be defended and that were rich with the 
resources needed for establishing a state.36 It has utilized different tactics in Syria 
and Iraq. In Syria, it has tended to seize territories that were already lost by the 
Syrian regime while avoiding extensive battles with the regime’s forces; at the 
same time, it has expanded its territories at the expense of other rebel groups.37 
ISIS has proved to be more pragmatic in Iraq, by forming alliances with Sunni 
militant groups related to the former Ba’ath regime.38 ISIS also assassinated Sunni 
tribal leaders who had allied with the United States during the Awakening in 
2007, as a way to preemptively prevent any future Sunni cooperation with the 
United States or the Iraqi government.39










The leaders of ISIS initially avoided the strategic mistakes 
of al Qaeda, whose focus on the global jihad contributed 
to its decline. To the contrary, ISIS leaders have preferred 
to follow in the footsteps of their founder, al-Zarqawi, by 
focusing on a strategy of fighting the Shi’a government 
in Iraq and the Alawi regime in Syria. This strategy has 
more popularity within Sunni communities than global 
jihad and can achieve higher levels of recruitment. For 
that reason, declaring a Sunni “Islamic State” that is 
contending against two Shi’a regimes, both of which 
are viewed as oppressing their Sunni populations, can 
achieve wide Sunni support. Moreover, ISIS declared a 
caliph of Arab origins—al-Baghdadi—whose ancestry is 
claimed to go back to the Prophet’s Quraysh tribe and 
who boasts a PhD in traditional Islam from the Islamic 
University of Baghdad.40 This step had more legitimacy and a stronger appeal to 
Sunni Muslims than did al Qaeda’s allegiance to an Afghan leader, Mullah Omar, 
whose background might be what prevented Osama bin Laden from declaring 
the Caliphate himself. 
As ISIS expanded in Iraq throughout 2014, it gained control over much of the 
Sunni provinces of Ninewa and Anbar, over portions of Salah ad-Din, and over 
the major cities of Mosul, Baiji, Tikrit, Hawija, Fallujah, Tal Afar, Sinjar, and 
areas close to Baghdad. In August 2014, the United States conducted air strikes 
that allowed the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Kurdish militia, known as the 
Peshmerga, to recapture the Mosul Dam and the town of Armeli. Nevertheless, 
the ISF managed to slow ISIS’s advance only with the support of Iranian armed 
forces and Iraqi Shi’a militias.41 In Syria, ISIS initially controlled about 35 percent 
of Syrian territory, mostly in the northeast, including six of Syria’s 10 oil fields.42 
ISIS declared the city of ar-Raqqa to be the capital of its self-declared caliphate. 
It also controlled most of the Syrian province of Deir ez-Zor and made many 
attempts to expand into Syrian Kurdish territories in the Hasakah province and 
into Syrian opposition territories in the northwest.43 
Analyst Eckart Woertz suggests that “ISIS is not a mere terror organization, 
but an insurgency that holds a classic ‘Clear, Hold, Build’ strategy. The aim is 
state building, as the very name ISIS suggests.”44 The group has a professional 
organizational structure with regional governors, a war cabinet, and departments 
responsible for media production, finance, recruitment, education, prisons, 
and religious guidance.45 Now holding a large amount of territory with about 8 
million people in it, ISIS provides a number of social services in addition to 
financing its military operations and paying the salaries of its fighters. It is 
believed that the main source of its current revenues is oil, followed by looting, 
local taxation, and financing from rich Gulf donors. Moreover, ISIS ben-
efited indirectly from the Gulf countries’ funding of rebel groups in Syria, many 
of which later joined ISIS.46  
Yet with the shift to global jihad, ISIS might be following a path that proved 
self-destructive for al Qaeda. After the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda lost its sanctuary 
in Afghanistan and has since struggled for resources and recruitment. By 
conducting terrorist attacks against countries that had not yet fully committed 
to fighting against it, as was the case with Turkey and France, ISIS is forcing these 
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countries into more active and effective participation. While France previously 
avoided conducting airstrikes on ISIS positions to prevent weakening their ability 
to fight against the Syrian government, it launched extensive airstrikes after the 
November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris.47 
Though the leaders of ISIS may understand the negative consequences of following 
the path of global jihad, they may have been pressured onto this path because 
of the losses they incurred in October and November 2015, after Russian forces 
launched a major intervention in support of the Syrian regime (mainly in 
Aleppo and Deir ez-Zour). At the same time, ISIS lost important areas in Iraq’s 
Baiji and Sinjar provinces to Kurdish and Iraqi forces with the support of US 
airstrikes.48 The main goal of ISIS’s attacks on Western and Russian targets could 
be a desperate attempt to prove the organization’s resilience and increase the 
levels of recruitment and support coming in by showing that it can still take the 
initiative and surprise its enemies with successful attacks. Nevertheless, the losses 
incurred by ISIS so far remain limited, and even if the shift to global jihad does 
prove counterproductive, ISIS still may not be easily defeated in the near future. 
This will be especially true if the Western coalition’s strategy, which has proven 
to be totally ineffective at countering ISIS for more than a year, does not change. 
It is worth remembering that al Qaeda was deprived of its safe haven in Afghani-
stan only because the United States committed sufficient resources and the 
direct involvement of US ground forces to the fight.
Why the US-Led Coalition’s Strategy Is Failing
The US Army War College curriculum defines strategy as “the employment of the 
instruments (elements) of power (political/diplomatic, economic, military, and 
informational) to achieve the political objectives of the state in cooperation or in 
competition with other actors pursuing their own objectives.”49 In this context, 
achieving the political objectives of a state is related to the cooperation or com-
petition of other actors. In addition, any strategist should “know the end state 
he wants to achieve” and “develop appropriate objectives leading to the desired 
end state.”50 In a speech on 10 September 2014, US President Barack Obama 
announced that the main objective of the US-led coalition against ISIS was to 
“degrade, and ultimately destroy, [ISIS] through a comprehensive and sustained 
counter-terrorism strategy.”51 This coalition, however, is formed of countries 
with different political objectives and different desired end states, which raises 
questions about the possible degree of their cooperation and consequently, the 
likelihood of achieving their various objectives.
The strategy of the coalition so far has consisted of conducting a systematic 
campaign of airstrikes against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria; increasing material 
support to the opposition forces fighting on the ground without introducing co-
alition ground forces; providing additional assistance and training to the Syrian 
opposition; interdicting ISIS’s funding streams; countering its ideology; and 
attempting to limit the flow of foreign fighters into ISIS’s ranks. While President 
Obama clearly stated that US intervention depended on the formation of an 
inclusive government in Iraq, only a few days before this speech, he declared the 
need to pursue a political solution to end the Syrian conflict without specifying 
the means to achieve it.52 He also highlighted the role of the coalition’s Arab 
members in mobilizing Sunni communities in Iraq and Syria to fight ISIS.53 
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Therefore, the coalition officially consists of countries that 
declared they would participate in operations against ISIS, 
yet unofficially, non-state actors such as the Kurdish forces 
and Syrian opposition militias have assumed a major role 
in counter-ISIS operations. 
Based on the speeches of President Obama and other 
coalition leaders, the expected role of each of the partici-
pants in the war against ISIS appears to be as follows:
1. The United States is the major contributor of air 
strikes and air support to the ground forces. It has 
also promised to train the Iraqi and Kurdish forces 
and increase support to the Syrian opposition 
groups. It has already pushed for a political resolu-
tion in Iraq, which manifested in the formation of 
the government of Haydar al-Abadi.54 To counter 
ISIS economically, the United States has targeted 
the oil refineries and oil-storage tanks controlled 
by ISIS with air strikes. In addition, the US Treasury 
Department has taken measures against the finan-
cial supporters of ISIS and is pressuring regional 
countries like Kuwait and Qatar to take similar 
measures against their citizens who sympathize 
with and fund ISIS.55
2. The Arab countries’ military contribution consists 
of logistical support in the form of access to their 
military bases, from which the United States can 
launch airstrikes and train Syrian militants.56 More 
important, the countries can help “mitigate the 
potential negative perceptions of this US military 
intervention in the Arab world.”57 They are also 
more effective than the United States or the Iraqi 
government at convincing Arab Sunni tribes to 
fight ISIS.58 And as mentioned previously, they 
have an important role in preventing the Gulf ’s 
private donors from sending money to the ex-
tremist groups in Syria.59 
3. Turkey’s participation in the coalition is crucial 
“because its long and porous borders with both 
Syria and Iraq are the entry point for foreign 
fighters.”60 By controlling its borders, Turkey 
can cut ISIS off from its major source of foreign 
fighters and control the smuggling of ISIS’s oil 
into Turkey.61 It can also provide logistical support 
by allowing the United States to use the Incirlik 
NATO base, located 60 miles from the Syrian 
border.62 Moreover, Turkey’s direct participation in 
military operations could be decisive in defeating 
ISIS, especially after the Turkish Parliament 
granted the government the authority to send 
troops into Iraq and Syria.63 
4. The Iraqi government is supposed to provide the 
forces on the ground for military operations. Its 
army is the only conventional army committed to 
fighting ISIS in Iraq without any legal constraints. 
5. The Kurdish Regional Government’s irregular 
forces, the Peshmerga, have proved to be more 
effective on the ground than the Iraqi Army. After 
the Iraqi Army collapsed and retreated in 2014, the 
Peshmerga moved into areas around Kirkuk and 
prevented ISIS from occupying more territories.64
6. The Syrian Kurds also proved to be effective at 
protecting their lands in eastern Syria, especially in 
defending the city of Kobani with the support of 
coalition airstrikes. 
7. The Free Syrian Army and other “moderate” 
groups are expected to fight ISIS and the Syrian re-
gime and to prevent al-Nusra and other extremist 
groups from taking areas under the control of the 
Syrian opposition.
A Collision of Coalition Interests
Although the strategy of the coalition to target ISIS by 
military, economic, and ideological means seems to be 
comprehensive, it is not politically coordinated. Many 
of the participants reportedly have joined the alliance 
for goals “unrelated to the degrading of [ISIS].”65 On 
the one hand, the regional countries are very concerned 
about achieving their political objectives in Iraq and 
Syria. On the other hand, the non-state actors in the 
fight have objectives ranging from survival to achieving 
self-governance. Therefore, the commitment of each of 
the participants to their individual political objectives 
rather than to their role in the coalition poses real chal-
lenges to the potential for military success: the failure of 
one participant to meet its obligations and objectives as 
a member of the coalition can lead to the failure of the 
whole campaign.
While the United States is clearly committed to its 
political and military objectives in Iraq and its support 
for the Iraqi government and the ISF, the Gulf countries 
are hesitant because any victory in Iraq can benefit the 
Shi’a-dominated government and its ally, Iran.66 At the 
same time, Baghdad is more concerned that any success 
achieved with the help of the Peshmerga would support 
the Kurds’ bid for complete autonomy or even indepen-
dence.67 Regarding Turkey’s role, both Baghdad and Erbil 
oppose a long-term military intervention by Turkish 
troops deep into Iraq.68 In Syria, the political situation is 
even more complicated. The United States has declared 
that coalition airstrikes are not meant to support the 
Assad regime, but at the same time, Washington fears that 
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the regime might indirectly benefit from these airstrikes 
and regain territories from ISIS. Gulf Arab countries 
need to demonstrate more commitment to the downfall 
of the Assad regime to calm their publics, who generally 
sympathize with ISIS.69 Turkey is more concerned about 
replacing the Assad regime than fighting ISIS, and it asso-
ciates the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), which 
is fighting ISIS in Syria, with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK), which Turkey considers to be a terrorist organiza-
tion.70 The Syrian opposition also accuses the PYD and its 
militant faction, the People’s Protection Units, of collabo-
rating with the Syrian government.71 
A study by the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies on the US air operations against ISIS in Iraq and 
Syria compares the current air operations to the air opera-
tions in several conventional and irregular wars: the First 
and Second Gulf Wars, the Kosovo campaign, the most 
recent war in Afghanistan, and the war against insurgents 
in Iraq between 2004 and 2011. The 
study concluded that these operations 
“have been very limited in comparison 
with other recent US campaigns.”72 In 
addition, the study finds that even when 
the United States started targeting ISIS 
in support of the Syrian Kurds in Ko-
bani, it diverted the air strike resources 
that were being used to support Iraqi 
forces in their fight against ISIS. This is 
inferred from the drop in the number of 
air operations in Iraq in mid-October 
2014 compared to September and early 
October, despite the fact that Iraqi 
forces were still struggling in Anbar.73 To put this in the 
context of the political discussion, the United States 
prefers to conduct a limited air campaign because of the 
allies’ disagreements over the desired political end states 
in Iraq and Syria. The United States fears that a larger air 
campaign may benefit the Assad regime in Syria, while 
the Gulf Arab countries oppose a larger campaign against 
ISIS in Iraq before there is a political resolution between 
the Sunni population and the Iraqi government. Another 
reason for the limited air campaign is insufficient intelli-
gence support from ground forces due to the political and 
sectarian nature of the conflict. The inability of the Iraqi 
government to control ISIS and the refusal of the Sunni 
populations to cooperate with the coalition limits access 
to intelligence information for the airstrikes.
The various actors’ political objectives are having a similar 
effect on the ground forces’ operations in both Iraq and 
Syria. A study by the RAND Corporation demonstrates 
that one of the reasons the Iraqi Army has been incapable 
of achieving long-term success against ISIS is the sectarian 
nature of the conflict.74 Although the Iraqi Army was 
able to stop ISIS and regain some of the lost territories 
in September 2014, they achieved this only with the 
support of Kurdish and Shi’a militias. Likewise in 2015, 
even with the support of US airstrikes, the Iraqi Army 
needed the participation of these militias to recapture 
territories in Tikrit, Baiji, and Ramadi. Other territories 
were regained by the militias, such as the retaking of 
Sinjar by the Kurdish forces in November 2015, without 
any coordination with the Iraqi government. This support 
from the militias can have negative effects at the political 
level, especially if the Iraqi Army tries to regain the more 
important Sunni areas in Mosul, because it reinforces 
the Sunni population’s perception of a Shi’a-dominated 
army doing the bidding of a mainly Shi’a government. 
Even with US air support, the Iraqi army needs to gain 
the support of the Sunni population for such operations 
to succeed. Moreover, even if the Gulf 
Arab countries become more willing to 
help the Iraqi government, the likeli-
hood of Sunni reconciliation and col-
laboration with the new government or 
a new “Awakening” among the tribes is 
small.75 As for the Kurdish forces, while 
the Arabs might accept the Peshmerga’s 
defense of Kurdish territories, the 
coalition cannot benefit from Kurdish 
support to recapture Arab-dominated 
territories because this could spark an 
ethnic Arab-Kurdish conflict.76  
The United States has faced serious obstacles to accom-
plishing its initial declared objective in Syria—to train 
and support the moderate Syrian opposition, mainly 
the Free Syrian Army, to stand up against ISIS and the 
Syrian Army. In October 2015, the Obama administra-
tion admitted the failure of its $500 million program 
to train moderate opposition fighters and replaced the 
failed program with direct support, including providing 
ammunition and weapons, to existing rebel groups.77 
This kind of direct support to such groups has previously 
proven ineffective because many Syrian rebel groups 
cooperate with Jabhat al-Nusra. As analyst Marc Lynch 
notes, “Syria’s combination of a weak, fragmented collage 
of rebel organizations with a divided, competitive array 
of external sponsors was the worst profile possible for 
effective external support.”78 Lynch states two necessary 
conditions for external support for the Syrian rebels to be 
effective: the external supporters themselves must adopt 
a unified approach, and there must be a unified rebel 
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organization to receive the support. These two conditions 
are not satisfied in the Syrian case: once again, conflicting 
political priorities stand in the way of unified and coordi-
nated support. The Saudi-Qatari rivalry, which affects the 
whole region, from the struggle over the Muslim Brother-
hood in Egypt to the support of different rebel groups in 
Syria, is a clear example. Another problem is the different 
perceptions that the United States and the Gulf countries 
have regarding which groups are “moderate.” Many of the 
Islamist groups that are supported by the Gulf countries 
are not considered moderate from a US perspective and 
are, therefore, not entitled to support.79 
Conclusion
ISIS has benefited from the political opportunity created 
by the Syrian conflict and Iraq’s sectarian and political 
problems. All the successes achieved by the United States 
and its allies in the fight against al Qaeda vanished with 
the rise of ISIS, which benefited greatly from both the 
reluctance of many countries to counter its expansion in 
Syria and Iraq and its ability to integrate groups and net-
works that were previously part of al Qaeda. This initial 
reluctance to fight ISIS, even after the formation of the 
coalition, was due mainly to a misperception that ISIS and 
al Qaeda are ideologically different and that ISIS presents 
only a regional threat rather than the global threat that 
al Qaeda posed. ISIS clearly proved these assumptions 
wrong, especially with the Paris terrorist attacks in 
November 2015, which some consider to be France’s 9/11. 
ISIS may prove even more threatening than al Qaeda if it is 
able to preserve its safe havens in Syria and Iraq. 
The swift rise and consolidation of ISIS clearly points out 
the failure of the coalition’s strategy, which has deployed 
only limited air resources and relatively weak local ground 
forces. The US-led coalition against ISIS also faced serious 
strategic challenges caused mainly by the complexity of 
the political situation in Iraq and Syria and the conflicting 
political priorities of the countries forming the coali-
tion. This lack of coordination influenced the level of 
commitment these countries were willing to make to the 
implementation of a comprehensive strategy to defeat 
ISIS. Now that Russia has strongly intervened in support 
of the Syrian regime, all the countries that have been 
awaiting the fall of Bashar al Assad’s government before 
they start fighting ISIS should recognize that this goal is 
no longer militarily achievable. If the United States wants 
to defeat ISIS, it should not take into account the con-
flicting political priorities of its allies, especially Turkey 
and the Arab Gulf states, but it should instead implement 
whatever strategy will achieve that goal. ²
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Language Skills for the Special Forces 
Operator: Access and Information in the 
African Permissive Environment
Maj Caleb Slayton,  
US Air Force
US and European military partnerships in Africa have been 
growing rapidly, as a quick glance at an AFRICOM (US Africa Command) map 
and a perusal of SOCAFRICA’s (Special Operations Command Africa) activities 
over the last seven years make evident.1 In response to invitations from different 
African countries, and their apparent interest in forming long-term relation-
ships, SOCAFRICA has aligned its forces in a way that encourages units to 
maintain regular contact with their African partners and to build progressively 
on these professional interactions. This means that an Army, Air Force, Navy, or 
Marine unit can specialize and invest in one African region or country instead of 
spreading its activity across multiple global regions.  
Despite this alignment, many organizations—including some in the military—
still have a hard time conceptualizing Africa as a continent, instead of as a single 
country. The diversity of African characters and personalities is most apparent in 
the continent’s hundreds of languages, cultures, clans, and unique histories. Even 
today, many tribal and ethnic groups are only slowly adopting national identities 
inside current political boundaries. If you study and interact with Africa only 
in relation to political boundaries and colonial languages, you will miss 
the heart and soul, as well as the undercurrents of society and culture that 
drive everything from commerce to government to transnational threats on this 
expansive continent.2 
Africa’s Linguistic Environment
For SOF personnel in Africa, being able to identify and apply the proper language 
and customs to a specific social engagement can mean the difference between 
merely discussing, for example, Boko Haram and potentially dissecting its net-
work. An extended conversation in Chadian Arabic, as opposed to French, can 
be the difference between understanding Chad’s perspective on Sahel terrorist 
schemes and haphazardly digesting what BBC and Al Jazeera reporters already 
know. Why? French, Portuguese, English, and Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) 
are second, third, or fourth languages for the overwhelming majority of sub-
Saharan Africans (parts of southern Africa excluded). Colonial languages are 
the medium of international business, diplomacy, literature, formal interactions, 
and tourism. In conversation, it is as if the use of colonial languages triggers a 
generalized, politicized, diplomatic, media copycat version of the social environ-
ment, threat networks included. Colonial languages are oddly adept at relaying 
what foreigners want to hear. 
Not so with local language—the heart language. When Nigerians, Cameroo-
nians, or any others, for that matter, want to vent, speak their mind, or elaborate 
a cultural concept, they prefer to use their mother tongue.3 Not only is a unique 
store of vocabulary available to the speaker, but sometimes abstract social and 
cultural concepts can become watered down or misconstrued unless they are 











of culture, the culture that exists “below the water” 
is difficult to express outside of the local language. In 
Africa, ideas and personalities can be outlined in colonial 
languages, but they are filled in and shaded through the 
deeply familiar first language. 
From one permissive environment to the next, I’ve put 
these language principles into practice.4 In northern 
Cameroon, a region now overrun by the terrorist group 
Boko Haram (which pledged allegiance to ISIS in early 
2015), I was able to complete a research thesis on religious 
syncretism thanks to the study of local language. Fluent 
French assisted me only to a limited extent in acquiring an 
understanding of the general outlines of religious rituals. 
After studying Fulfulde and relaying the same ideas in 
Giziga and Masana, the trite, one-word answers in French 
that I had been getting from local friends and informants 
transformed through these languages into paragraphs 
of spiritual soliloquies, explanations of village religious 
dynamics, and the details of taboos and grievances among 
the diverse populations. In Senegal, Niger, and Chad, I 
was overly optimistic about what my 
French fluency could achieve. Six weeks 
of immersion in Wolof, Djerma, and 
Chadian Arabic, respectively, however, 
allowed me to build relationship ties 
that two years of study in French could 
never have created.
This analysis is not meant to discourage 
the study of French, Arabic, or Portu-
guese—and by no means is fluency in 
a local language required to begin making sincere con-
nections with your host partner. Twenty local greetings, 
which can be memorized in a week, can easily translate 
to a five-minute discussion. Moreover, knowledge of 
language and culture go hand in hand. For example, I 
was immersed in East African culture and the widespread 
Kiswahili language in my youth, which meant that what 
I lacked in local language fluency I could make up for in 
appropriate social behavior and protocol.5 
I find that fluency gives the speaker access to others’ 
feelings—those intangible trends that describe the social 
environment.6 Two months of Fulfulde immersion, like 
six weeks of daily Djerma practice, won’t enable a discus-
sion of complex politics, but for those who travel from 
country to country, demonstrating the willingness to learn 
local languages serves as a relational building block. A 
colonial language like French, by contrast, is appropriate 
for broader and deeper applications, and is more condu-
cive to operations across borders.
“Access” for the Special Forces Operator
To a SOF operator in a permissive or semi-permissive 
environment, which is more important: short-term 
access to information or in-depth access through relation-
ships? The military culture of strict timelines, combined 
with SOF tactical prowess and 15 years of involvement in 
non-permissive environments, have corrupted the nature 
of foreign internal defense (FID), civil-military relations, 
information operations, and many other dominant SOF 
core capabilities. Language and culture-specific skills 
have become a mere data point on the operator’s résumé. 
We have allowed tradecraft and tactics to dominate the 
interaction in permissive environments, making long-term 
engagements and sincere relationships very difficult. 
This shift in emphasis means the military is missing what 
thousands of NGO personnel, embassy employees, and 
international business people take for granted: language 
is not simply a part of tradecraft. It is an essential tool 
of both everyday life and sincere interaction with any 
host nation and long-term partner. 
Rather than let tradecraft dominate our 
interactions, we can rely on language 
to provide the cultural map and access 
to meaningful relations that make 
tactical tradecraft irrelevant. Language 
competency offers much more than 
access to information or intelligence; 
these are short-sighted objectives. What 
SOF are missing in their haste to exploit 
tradecraft and tactical execution is a 
grasp of the local environment and the atmosphere of a 
village, region, or country, along with the development 
of sincere relationships that can be gained only through 
interchanges in the local language. 
Status of Forces agreements, Acquisition and Cross-Ser-
vicing agreements, and numerous other such bilateral and 
multilateral contracts are important first steps in building 
relationships at the top level. But for the SOF operator 
who is building relationships with populations, a piece of 
paper is not always a key to access into a society. Access in 
sub-Saharan Africa is not a signed and dated statement; 
it is a continuous process of inter-relational exchanges. 
Generally speaking, Africa’s cultures are cultures of 
relationships, not contracts.
Over a period of a few weeks during my time in Chad, 
I was fortunate to build friendships with two Chadian 
military security and logistics officers. Their French 
was weak at best, allowing us only to exchange friendly 
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salutations and enquire about family health and other such general topics. In my 
endeavor to understand the political environment of Chad, I asked in French 
about terrorist groups in the region. Their answer was that there were none. I 
asked about the security situation in Chad. They said it was perfect. I asked what 
it was that makes Chad’s politics and regional military interactions so unique. 
They responded, “Événements” (French for “events”). These observations were all 
partly true but also wholly unhelpful. 
Then I broke into Arabic, and the country of Chad unfolded before me in the 
most intricate social and cultural fluidity.
Not only was the Chadian logistics captain able to express his thoughts, but I 
could also read his excitement and sense his national pride, and I was beginning 
to piece together an insider’s picture of this very dynamic country. According 
to the captain, terrorism was the result of weak youth—city softies who had lost 
their connection to the desert and their cultural heritage. I learned about the 
difference between desert life, southern kafir life, and the city’s entanglements. 
He described what it was like to travel in a Toyota convoy across international 
borders on desert trails, where supply trains were limited or non-existent. Finally, 
by communicating in Arabic, I learned about my friend, his family, and his 
thoughts on regional security. I was able to share my own life with him in turn. 
We had grown a friendship.
Americans in Africa
While I cannot speak for other non-Africans, I have noted that I and other 
Americans have at least three broad advantages in our cultural engagements in 
Africa. First, those who have limited language skills can create bonds quickly by 
surprising their welcoming or hesitant African counterpart with some phrases in 
his or her language. Second, for those who speak only English, it is not difficult 
to quickly find new friends who are anxious to practice their English skills and 
thereby become more competitive in the local job market. Finally, as a testament 
to Americans who have come before us, most Africans have a kindly disposition 
toward the United States and are eager to interact with Americans. The down-
side? In English-speaking countries like Uganda, the Gambia, Kenya, or Ghana, 
you inevitably put all your eggs in one linguistic basket and can only hope your 
counterpart has a favorable view of the United States or what it can “offer.” If 
not, you may hear little that is useful. Paradoxically, local language skills can be 
that much more important in countries where English is a primary language. 
Without them, you’re just like everyone else. 
GENERALLY SPEAKING, 
AFRICA’S CULTURES 





What’s your name, sir?
My name is Kelebi. 
















What about francophone countries? As an American, be aware that even your 
best French accent will give you away. Like English, French can be a comfort-
able language for highly educated political officials and foreign-trained military 
officers. For that small minority, the colonial language is very useful. On one 
occasion, for example, I was sitting in a seminar room with security elements and 
SOF commanders from four neighboring countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, 
and Nigeria). It was impossible for this group to communicate in anything other 
than French and English because they were the only two common languages of 
the Lake Chad region. Access to more than one language in this environment 
was indispensable. In sidebar discussions, the partners spoke in local languages—
some of which did reach across multiple borders—to describe their views of 
terrorism, elaborate on the local social networks, and voice the region’s chal-
lenges and popular perceptions. Each linguistic interaction added another facet 
to the overall argument. 
The fluent speaker of colonial languages often represents the political view, 
the state perspective. But Africa’s politics do not always align neatly with 
international relations theory’s state-centric analysis. Rather, the populations, 
the religious leaders, the streets, and the villages embody the most powerful 
variables, decoded in multiple linguistic nuances. 
Outsiders to local language, politics, and culture can ultimately misread the 
permissive environment altogether. In one humorous example, I was on board 
the latest version MC-130J aircraft as we rolled into a Nigerian military ramp. 
Rows of Nigerian maintenance teams paused in their work as each man raised 
the latest model smartphone (along with a few iPads) to capture—and, no 
doubt, announce—the aircraft’s arrival. Like any professional, these maintenance 
troops were giddy to see the latest factory model in their industry. The SOF aerial 
platform was a far cry from the scrap models surrounding the ramp that were 
being used for parts.
Even though the MC-130J presence was for a regional unclassified exercise, the 
American crew was a little wary of so much attention—a SOF presence regret-
tably uploaded to the cloud. But instead of hyping the instance as an operational 
security concern, the air crew broke through the awkward cultural barrier and 
brought the interaction into the human domain. After all, Nigerians speak 
English, and any C-130 crew anywhere in the world would naturally be curious 
to see the latest model. Instead of worrying about what could not be helped, 
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photographers, asking them to share their pictures with us and tell us their 
impressions. 
Unless we allow ourselves to push against cultural barriers, we may be missing 
the sincerity and honesty of our own host partner—as well as the opportunity to 
transform insecurities into sincere curiosity and relationship-building. 
Operators and Enablers in a Permissive yet Sensitive 
Environment
The SOF world has developed various official and tacit status levels for different 
types of operators and enablers. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with 
Hollywood movies, have identified the direct action tactical combat experts as 
the “elite force.” What tactical experts do is tough. Their training is extensive and 
intense. For my part, I’ve dedicated long years of study to language acquisition 
and have been asked why someone like me wouldn’t “cross over” to join the more 
prestigious club. In other words, why wouldn’t someone leave the enabler world 
of relation-building and try for something more elite? But the reverse logic could 
be directed at SF operators: they already have the tactical knowledge, so why 
wouldn’t they cross over to the side that makes a deeper, more fruitful impact on 
their host partners through language?
I’ve noticed that the best Army Rangers can demonstrate tactical acumen 
through swift, decisive action, but they truly prove their worth to an African 
partner by squatting on their heels, resting their armpits on their knees, and 
bantering in pidgin English with, for example, members of Nigeria’s Special 
Boat team or Cameroon’s Rapid Intervention Battalions. Africans want partners 
who can see beyond the threat—who can communicate in small unit tactics but 
also interact in sincere relationships. That is the difference between short- and 
long-term security development. Some would call this HUMINT—collecting or 
tradecraft. I prefer to call it conversation. Short-term solutions reduce interac-
tions to tactical terms; from a long-term perspective, it’s called “being human.” 
Sometimes all the military jargon, qualification tabs, and tactical courses on 
communication can make us forget what it means simply to be human.
Local atmospherics and language research can easily identify a permissive envi-
ronment. If you miss the cultural identifiers, you risk mislabeling the environ-
ment and misclassifying a partner as a threat. You cannot operate in the “orange” 
or the “red” at all times. Special forces working in a permissive environment have 
the opportunity on the one hand to build on local partnerships. Ignorance, on 
the other hand, leaves the operator with no choice but to rely on self-sufficiency, 

















Ai ga irkoy saabu.














the wrong signal within the permissive environment and are the complete opposite 
of SF’s intent. A smile extended to those in your local environment and a respectful 
exchange in the local language can be more effective than razor wire and more 
protective than the menacing face of aircraft security. Retreating to the tactical 
“safe zone” can easily invite the opposite effect. Even verbal judo has its place, but 
languages like Hassaniya, Wolof, Songhay, Tamashek, Djerma, Hausa, Fulfulde, 
Luganda, Kiswahili, and Somali are security multipliers beyond calculation. 
In early 2015, at a time when parts of central Africa had become less stable under 
Boko Haram’s advances, an aircraft was scheduled to meet me and a small group 
I’d been working with at an airfield after dark. Through no fault of their own, 
unit intelligence had prepared the aircraft security element with inaccurate 
information on threats in the region, which influenced the crew to take a robust 
security posture upon arrival and parking. After observing the approach of their 
stone-faced security detail, I led a few of the crew members around the airfield 
and introduced them in the local language to the “threat” rustling in the bushes: 
the sandaled AK-47–toting security guards. The air crew now have the pictures to 
prove it: this dark airfield was an unknown factor to the aircrew, but it was far 
from being a threat. The seeming “threat” became an asset—those local guards 
represented an extra layer of security who knew the true environment leagues 
beyond what a transient team could ever know.
It is never wise to let your guard down completely, but it’s always helpful to 
know what you’re guarding against. The permissive environment offers SF more 
security assistance on which to build, especially when they are using local lan-
guage and relationships. Relationships in the permissive environment also offer 
SF the best source of advanced warning—something a limited ring of perimeter 
security could never offer their camp or aircraft. 
Ten years after I lived in northern Cameroon, for example, the region was 
threatened by violent extremism. As I followed up on the NGO personnel who 
lived in the now troubled region, I found out that their 
long-term friendships with the Fulani and their daily use 
of the Fulfulde language became an early warning device 
when the situation turned dangerous. The same was true 
for the coast of Kenya, where only a few short years ago 
Mombasa and Lamu were prime tourist destinations 
instead of the terrorist targets they have since become. In 
both of these locations, the NGO staffs were connected 
through deep friendships to the local residents. As the 
terrorist group al Shabaab developed its Kenyan offshoots, it would attack 
various local districts on random evenings, making them increasingly dangerous 
for passersby. If these NGO outsiders had not been plugged in to the local ethno-
linguistic culture, they would not have been able to read the shifts in the security 
level. The permissive environment implies partnership-building by invitation 
and a level of security that provides more freedom of movement for perceptive 
outsiders. From Senegal to Mali to Chad, and in parts of Kenya and Somalia, the 
permissive environment can still be politically sensitive.7 
Adopting the Long-Term Mindset
The majority of African environments allow for operator education to take 
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conversations with military partners, street vendors, shopkeepers, chauffeurs, 
and political activists invariably take a different trajectory depending on the 
language spoken. Speaking Djerma, the chauffeur wants to know why I haven’t 
found a local wife to supplement my Sahel lifestyle. Speaking Chadian Arabic, 
my shopkeeper acquaintance wants to assist me in finding the right medicinal 
herbs to cure what ails me. In Fulfulde, my military partner is excited to share 
with me his cultural background, the dynamics of family relationships in the 
Sahel, and his disgust with local politics and corruption. 
Local language, combined with sincere interest, offers access to shops and 
markets where the vendors don’t interact enough with foreigners to know how 
to hassle them. You will feel the curious stares of your fellow tea shop clients, 
unaccustomed to seeing the tubaab, nassara, or mzungu (“foreigner” or “white” 
in the languages of Senegal, Niger, Chad, and parts of East Africa, respectively) 
in such an authentic environment. In my experience, local language brings broad 
grins all around. It moves you from the courtyard to the sitting room. In short, 
the commitment to building long-term relationships will change the way you 
see and experience a country. Perhaps French or English could achieve a similar 
outcome—but if you rely only on colonial languages you’ll never know what you 
may be missing.
SOCAFRICA’s mission is to build long-term partnerships at all levels. It is very 
difficult, however, for education to keep pace with the rapid expansion of these 
relationships. Language can provide security in an unknown environment. Lan-
guage can allow us to explore ideas and reap insights into actual threats, the local 
perception of threats, and population networks. But even this is a limited view of 
the SF potential offered by better cultural and language education. Language is 
an investment in long-term relationships where tactics become secondary and SF 
can again become people. ²
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 IN MY EXPERIENCE, 
LOCAL LANGUAGE 
BRINGS BROAD GRINS 
ALL AROUND.
NOTES
1  See the AFRICOM website for more information: http://www.
africom.mil/africa
2  About the author: Between 1983 and 2015, I lived in East 
and Central Africa, studying African security and languages, 
before finally deploying for US Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM). I have learned French, Portuguese, and Arabic; 
spent time in Malawi, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Uganda, Egypt, 
Chad, Niger, Senegal, and Liberia; lived in Mozambique, Kenya, 
Cameroon, and Tunisia; and immersed myself in the ethno-
linguistic environments of Makhua, Kiswahili, Fulfulde (Fulani), 
Djerma, Hausa, Wolof, and Chadian Arabic.
3  In Nigeria and Cameroon, even English has a common pidgin 
variant.
4 A permissive environment is one where the host country’s military 
and law enforcement have control and are willing and able to assist 
operations as needed.
5  Kiswahili has a wide reach, serving as a common language for 
millions of people in Tanzania, Kenya, and parts of Uganda and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Consequently, an outsider 
speaking a few phrases in Kiswahili will not surprise locals as much 
as the use of lesser-known languages in other regions.
6 These are the “atmospherics” that we often rely on interpreters to 
explain.
7 This paper does not touch on the non-permissive environments 
found today in Libya, parts of northern Mali, and the al Shabaab–
occupied regions of southern Somalia. Learning the local language 
of a non-permissive environment is still extremely helpful, but the 
caution necessary to interact and build proper relationships in 
such an environment requires much greater sensitivity. It is easier 
to correct misconceptions using indigenous language in a location 
where you are more of a curiosity than a potential enemy or threat. 
February 2016
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Siding with the Egg Dr. Siamak Naficy, US Naval  Postgraduate School and 
MAJ Joshua Russo, US Army
Between a high, solid wall and an egg that breaks against it, I will 
always stand on the side of the egg.
 —  Author Haruki Murakami, upon accepting the Jerusalem 
Prize for Literature1
About two months after 9/11, Osama bin Laden boasted to a 
group of supporters, “When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by 
nature, they will like the strong horse.”2 Not only did the weak horse turn out to 
be bin Laden’s own, however, but bin Laden was also probably quite mistaken 
about popular psychology. Data from social psychology suggest that a majority 
of people consistently favor and identify with the “underdog,” whether it be in 
politics or in sports, or even with shapes on a map.3 In one such example, when 
subjects were shown a map of Israel dwarfing the occupied Palestinian territories, 
they expressed greater support for the Palestinians, but when they were shown 
a map of the neighboring Arab countries dwarfing Israel, they expressed more 
support for Israel. 
The underdog is colloquially defined as the one who is at a disadvantage in a 
contest or competition and therefore is expected to lose.4 This underdog exists, 
of course, in relation to another, the “top dog,” who has the advantage of more 
resources and as such, is most likely to win. This rhetorical structure applies to 
many well-known stories. Tales of the underdog hero—as portrayed in popular 
Hollywood movies like Rocky and Star Wars, in books like The Lord of the Rings, 
and in sports narratives such as the 1980 US Olympic hockey team’s defeat of the 
Soviet Union in the “Miracle on Ice”—have a broad appeal.5 Businesses and po-
litical candidates, US President Barack Obama among them, routinely position 
themselves as underdogs to take advantage of this psychological phenomenon.6 
The underdog effect is not a uniquely American narrative, either.7 Stories about 
underdogs are found across cultures and religious texts—such as the Old Testa-
ment story of David and Goliath—and throughout history, such as Aesop’s fable 
of the tortoise and the hare, from approximately the sixth century BCE. 
(En)Countering the Underdog Narrative
George Washington was fighting the strongest military in the 
world, beyond all reason. That’s what we’re doing. Exactly.
 — Osama Hamdan (Hamas politburo member)8
How a conflict is framed and thus perceived, and who the players are supposed 
to be or are imagined to be, are as relevant to what people think about the fight 
as how it is fought. Robert Entman, a professor of media and public affairs 
at George Washington University, defines framing as “the process of culling 
a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights 
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connections among them to promote a particular inter-
pretation.” 9 We know that political and security objectives 
cannot always be achieved through greater material or 
numbers. But data on possible psychological biases in 
favor of underdogs would suggest more: the use of military 
instruments of power—whether it be in the form of 
boots on the ground or bombs from the sky—can in fact 
strengthen the perceived deservedness of a comparatively 
weaker underdog adversary and amplify its narrative. The 
fact that disadvantaged entities might be motivated by this 
sense of righteous entitlement to fight on—and that third-
party audiences might feel emotionally compelled to side 
with such groups—is crucial to both our understanding 
of human psychology and our capacity to craft coherent 
national security policies and their associated narratives. 
Meanwhile, there is evidence to suggest that there is cross-
cultural variation in the likelihood that an audience will 
favor underdogs. Underdog biases tend 
to be stronger for individuals who are 
from cultures in which underdog narra-
tives are part of their national or group 
identity.10 Studies also indicate that there 
are boundaries to the underdog effect 
beyond which observers of the competi-
tion perceive the disadvantaged side no 
longer as an underdog but simply as a 
loser and undeserving of support.11 This 
would suggest that there is no simple 
“underdogma” phenomenon whereby 
people reflexively believe that whichever side they see as 
disadvantaged is therefore also more righteous. If this 
is the case, then it follows that counter-narratives can 
be crafted that (1) are tailored to possible cross-cultural 
affinities for an underdog biography, and (2) amplify the 
reasons that a disadvantaged side may have violated the 
requisite conditions of underdoggedness.
The Size of the Fight in the Dog
It’s not the size of the dog in the fight; it’s 
the size of the fight in the dog.
 — Unknown12
One explanation for underdog support and human 
psychological biases in favor of such entities is the rational 
calculation of one’s own emotions. In other words, 
because an underdog’s success is by definition unexpected, 
this may increase the excitement of rooting for the 
underdog (calculated by its likeliness to win or lose). In 
this way, rather than being strongly supportive of under-
dogs, people might instead actually be rooting against the 
dominant entities, an attitude captured by the sentiment, 
“My favorite baseball team is whoever is playing against 
the Yankees.”
The data from social psychology seems to also suggest, 
however, that at least part of the reason people favor 
the underdog is our perceived sense of the underdog’s 
“disadvantage.” For example, students watching a taped 
basketball game not only rooted for whichever team they 
had been told was the underdog, but also attributed more 
“hustle, effort, heart, and wanting to win” to that team. In 
this way, people may favor the disadvantaged underdog 
because we want to help compensate for what we consider 
to be undeserved inequality. “If one contestant is out-
matched for reasons that aren’t his fault, that’s unfair, and 
our sense of justice reaches out to fix it.”13
According to marketing experts Anat Kienan, Jill Avery, 
and Neehu Paharia, “The biographies of 
underdog brands share two important 
narrative components: a disadvantaged 
position (they highlight a company’s 
humble beginnings and portray it as 
being ‘outgunned’ by bigger, better-
resourced competitors) and a passion 
and determination to triumph against 
the odds.” 14 Various studies in the fields 
of marketing and social psychology 
define underdogs similarly: a materially, 
socially, or physically disadvantaged 
entity that displays a “strong will or indefatigable spirit” 
during a competitive struggle.15 
In line with this reasoning, then, if the team (or group or 
individual) that is likely to lose is not disadvantaged, that 
side should no longer enjoy favoritism. Accordingly, when 
research subjects were told that a team was likely to lose 
and that it had a lot less money than the other team, they 
rooted for that team. But when they were told that a team 
was likely to lose even though it had a lot more money than 
the other team, they didn’t much care who won.16 Disad-
vantage alone, then, is insufficient for observers to perceive 
a contender as an underdog. Stripping a disadvantaged 
opponent of its underdog status may require the crafting 
of counter-narratives that demonstrate the reasons that the 
opponent, though possibly disadvantaged in one or more 
domains, is not a true underdog deserving of support.  
The current data suggest that these boundaries, or under-
dog qualifiers, can be divided into two general catego-
ries: those that are dependent on the observer and those 
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underdog. In other words, if one already identifies with one of the competitors, 
then that competitor’s narrative status as underdog or top dog may not matter all 
that much. It is when one has no dog in the fight, so to speak, that an underdog 
narrative may become compelling. Unsurprisingly, the degree of sympathy and 
support offered to the underdog is often simply a function of the observer’s vicar-
ious self-serving motives.17 Relatively neutral observers are likely to feel sympathy 
for the underdog only when there is little negative personal consequence for 
doing so. Observers who strongly identify with the underdog—those who view 
themselves as players on the disadvantaged team—may be unswayed by the high 
personal risk their support engenders.18 
In the world of Star Wars—a classic underdog narrative in popular culture—the 
question becomes whether it would be possible to convince Luke Skywalker and 
Han Solo not to join the Rebel Alliance. It would likely be harder to dissuade 
Luke Skywalker because he has the ideologue Obi-Wan Kenobi to recruit and 
mentor him, as well as personal reasons—such as the assassinations of his uncle 
and aunt by imperial stormtroopers—to identify against the Empire. (At least, 
Luke is told by Obi-Wan that storm troopers are responsible for the attack that 
killed his relatives.) But, what of Han Solo? It might be worth the time to con-
sider why we accept the idea that a self-serving smuggler—who says he doesn’t 
believe in “hokey religions” like the Jedi and calls Luke’s assault against the 
Death Star not an act of “courage” but one of “suicide”—would end up joining 
Luke and the Rebel Alliance in the end.
A strong desire for fairness may also allow observers to justify a moral double 
standard when evaluating the actions of underdogs and top dogs.19 This double 
standard holds the top dog to the letter of the law, but it turns a blind eye to the 
occasionally unsavory behavior of the underdog. Thus Israel is a bully, if you see 
it primarily as the oppressor of Palestinians, or a victim, if you see it as facing 
persistent existential threats. Nevertheless, there is undoubtedly some threshold 
beyond which the relatively neutral observer, on the one hand, can no longer 
overlook the underdog’s moral transgressions. Observers that strongly identify 
with the underdog, on the other hand, may have no such threshold.  
DISADVANTAGE ALONE 
IS INSUFFICIENT FOR 
OBSERVERS TO PERCEIVE 
A CONTENDER AS 
AN UNDERDOG.
Han Solo and Luke Skywalker, Star Wars Episode 6: Return of the Jedi
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The Palestinian resistance organization Hamas provides a good example of this 
double standard. In its recent 2014 war with Israel, Hamas may have damaged 
its own underdog-brand credibility in the eyes of many neutral observers. When 
compared to previous battlefield encounters with the Israeli Defense Force in 
2008–2009 and 2012, Hamas’s military wing performed impressively well in 
2014. Yet despite its relative tactical success, widespread condemnation of alleged 
war crimes among regional and international audiences threatened to diminish 
Hamas’s traditional underdog position and with it, an aura of deservedness.20 
For most closely affiliated supporters of Hamas, however, the organization’s 
conduct in the recent war probably needed no explanation or justification—these 
observers were sufficiently invested in the Hamas cause to remain convinced of 
its righteousness. For those not already committed to a side, however, damage 
to or loss of the underdog label can shift attitudes regarding its deservedness. It 
was this dilemma that arguably compelled the Hamas leadership to wage a media 
campaign of damage control in the aftermath of the war, in an attempt to restore 
underdog legitimacy with a larger audience.21 
Underdog qualifiers that depend on the observer’s perception of the disad-
vantaged team’s performance comprise the second category. The underdog 
demonstrates its deservedness not only through its actions but also through its 
narrative. Underdogs must demonstrate passion, endurance, and “hustle” to be 
judged as deserving of support.22 If individuals or group members show a lack of 
effort, they are more likely to be regarded as losers.23 The perceived probability 
of underdog success in the competition is another qualifier. Although observers 
often overestimate the likelihood of success,24 underdogs “need to come close 
on occasion or at least show flashes of potential in order to merit support.” 25 In 
one study, “participants showed the strongest rooting for the underdog team 
when it was unlikely—but not impossible—to prevail.” 26 Finally, the underdog 
narrative must be negatively framed—the sympathetic protagonist struggling 
against the odds—in order to win support.27 
The self-declared Islamic State (aka ISIS) has proven adept at portraying itself 
as a deserving underdog with impressive hustle. The group’s combat footage 
highlights three themes: (1) smiling martyrdom-seekers who are ready and 
willing to sacrifice themselves for the cause; (2) hard-fighting foot soldiers who 
demonstrate tactical skill and grit; and (3) battlefield victories against ISIS’s 
numerous better-supplied enemies, in which its fighters seize large quantities of 
weapons and equipment. The resultant underdog narrative is a strong one. In the 
face of a well-resourced international coalition, ISIS is not backing down. On the 
contrary, its sophisticated information operations not only convey battlefield 
competence and determination, but also suggest that the Islamic State has great 
future potential.28 
Conclusion: Turning Underdogs into Losers
The guerilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses 
if it does not win.
 —  Henry Kissinger29
Embracing and perpetuating the status of the underdog assists groups in garnering 
support that would otherwise be unavailable to them. The indirect and tacit sup-
port underdogs receive from observers may be the very thing that allows them to 
ISIS IS ADEPT AT 
PORTRAYING ITSELF 





continue their struggle. Usually this support comes from 
those who care less about the outcome or consequences 
of a struggle than they do about the qualities or attri-
butes of the players involved. By disallowing the label of 
underdog for radical groups through targeted information 
campaigns, states can subvert sideline support for these 
extremist organizations.
Of course, clever communicators are aware of their 
audience and wield flexible and fluid narratives. An 
underdog always exists in relation to a top dog. As such, 
an underdog narrative may not always be advisable or 
possible. The fictional boxer Rocky Balboa may have been 
an underdog when compared to the champion, Apollo 
Creed, but he would be no underdog in a match with 
at least one of the authors of this paper. Likewise, in the 
Star Wars films, Luke Skywalker 
and the Rebel Alliance are the 
underdogs pitted against Darth 
Vader and the Galactic Empire, 
but would have been top dogs 
compared to, say, the Ewoks of 
Endor.30 
ISIS’s leaders appear to understand 
the group’s various audiences well: 
their media operations are care-
fully calibrated for local, regional, 
and international consumption as 
well as for would-be constituents.31 
The group’s regionally oriented 
media content—arguably the 
most potent of its products—
aims, in part, to inspire a particular 
slice of the neutral or partially 
invested observer population by 
promoting the status of ISIS as an 
underdog fighting a regional war against corrupt Middle 
Eastern regimes and wealthy (and corrupt) Western inter-
ventionists. Of course, when measured against the diverse 
array of Levantine Sunni jihadi groups—many of which 
also espouse violence and the reestablishment of a regional 
caliphate—ISIS is no underdog and even poses a lethal 
threat to some of these groups. This fact only underscores 
the potency of a well-framed and manipulated underdog 
narrative. 
It is, of course, unrealistic to try to frame global powers 
like the United States as underdogs in irregular warfare. 
Strategic planners should instead consider crafting 
counter-narratives that tarnish the underdog image their 
extremist adversaries cultivate. It is to our advantage that 
many of the jihadi fighters who profess pious principles 
regularly ignore their own stated moral ideals. It may be 
possible to minimize the indirect support that ISIS and its 
ilk receive by attacking their appealing underdog image 
and recasting them as hypocrites and losers. 
We have seen how tactical strikes such as those from 
predator drones can backfire in public opinion by making 
martyrs of their targets. Media campaigns that highlight 
the apostasy of violent jihadi groups—especially their 
leaders—may be a better way to erode the groups’ attrac-
tion for new recruits. Disseminating accurate reports 
and images of revered leaders—sporting Rolex watches 
and committing rape and cold-blooded murder—can 
help shift their popular image from the idealized one of 
deserving underdogs fighting the good fight to the more 
realistic one of self-indulgent criminals ready to exploit 
their would-be supporters.32 No 
single technique will likely be 
sufficient to bring about this shift, 
of course, and it will be necessary 
to tailor-make these counter-
narratives for specific audiences. 
For example, a particularly strong 
argument can be made by am-
plifying the stories of defectors. 
While some returning foreign 
fighters will no doubt seek to self-
glorify by exaggerating their pur-
ported accomplishments, there 
are also those who leave because 
they have become disillusioned 
by their experiences. In exchange 
perhaps for a safe return or some 
other incentive, these voices can 
be instrumental in countering 
the narratives the jihadis use for 
foreign recruitment. 
In addition, counter-narratives to discourage foreign 
recruits should highlight the fact that these fighters are 
routinely exploited by extremist leaders to settle local dis-
putes rather than to pursue the regional or international 
goals that the recruits might have had in mind when they 
joined up. For instance, between 2005 and 2007, a cadre 
of suicide bombers in Iraq was used not against coali-
tion troops but in small affairs targeting local tribes and 
groups. An Iraqi emir described the situation in a letter 
quoted in a 2008 Washington Post report. 
Potential suicide bombers were told by coordinators on 
the border that they could choose a suicide mission, which 
would kill 20 to 30 US-led troops or their supporters, the 
letter says. Yet a would-be bomber would then wait in the 
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desert for months. “At the end he will be asked to do a small operation, such as 
murdering someone or blowing up a police car,” the emir wrote. The foreigners 
would then become discouraged, he said, and return to their home countries.33 
Such groups also routinely devour their own in other ways, either by arbitrarily 
meting out “justice” for undesirable actions or making sure would-be defectors 
publicly pay with their own lives.34 One 2014 report states that “ISIS has executed 
at least 120 of its own militants in the past three months, the majority of whom 
were foreign fighters trying to return home, according to a Syrian monitoring 
group.” 35 Stories of treachery and the murder of recruits can be amplified and 
disseminated to effectively influence both foreign and local audiences.36
These are only a few examples of campaigns that could be designed to combat 
jihadis’ “deserving underdog” narrative. It must be conceded, however, that 
these various examples still feel weak, paternalistic, and negative, especially when 
compared to the “positive” recruitment message from an Islamist warrior who 
appears, by virtue of his underdog status, to deserve respect and support. They all 
lack the empowering draw and broad arc of the ISIS story of standing “up against 
the world.” Custom-made counter-narratives that are personalized to fit specific 
audiences will be stronger.
Meanwhile, the fact that the United States routinely perceives itself as the top 
dog, in terms of military capability and resources, versus adversaries that use 
asymmetric strategies may be counterproductive. In 480 BCE, to take one famous 
historical example, a resonant underdog narrative coalesced around the Greek 
victory over the Persian navy at Salamis. The Persians, whose trireme fleet was 
markedly superior to that of their opponents in terms of number of vessels, naval 
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technology, and combat seamanship, exposed themselves to defeat by seeking 
to trap and overwhelm the Greeks in the confines of the Salamis straits. If US 
officials and strategic planners were more judicious in their selection of methods 
and instruments to execute their policies, the United States might smack less of 
a top dog throwing its weight around. For example, all things being equal, the 
United States, like the ancient Persians, fed certain insurgent narratives when it 
deployed heavy, armored units to Iraq and then lost dozens of technologically 
advanced tanks to improvised roadside bombs and accidental rollovers into canal 
ditches. In other words, perceiving and projecting oneself as a top dog has the 
potential to undermine strategy. 
This is not to say that assuming the role of the inevitable winner is always 
inadvisable, but there are consequences and tradeoffs to doing so, and strategic 
postures and narratives must be crafted with such consequences in mind. Top 
dogs who persist in looking through the veil of their own narratives can find it 
difficult to appreciate the more discrete and subtle means that they may have at 
their disposal. ²
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Trying to Work Smarter: Fusion Tools for a 
Small SOF TF Staff 
Major Awe,  
Army Special Forces
A new buzz phrase is circulating among SOF planners and 
operators these days: operation and intelligence fusion. The goal is for the 
operations and intelligence sections to work together more closely; become 
better integrated; and feed off each other’s thinking, ideas, and processes to 
produce better outcomes. Military operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere 
have matured over the last decade into police-led operations to disrupt and 
degrade insurgent and criminal networks. As a result, the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) staffs have needed to “work smarter” in order to develop 
a concept of operations (CONOPS) and get approval from higher authorities, as 
well as respond to numerous requests for information and reports. Naturally, this 
puts a lot of strain on the staff: how can a small SOF staff create an operation-
intelligence fusion environment, along with an approach that facilitates the 
development and direction of intelligence-led policing operations?
Small SOF task forces (SOF TFs or simply TFs) typically don’t have enough 
staff to handle all of the training and mentoring needs, as well as the targeting 
efforts and the execution, required by such police operations. Normally, these 
operations have been driven from the bottom up, and the demand from higher 
headquarters was for a high operational tempo. As the police forces took 
responsibility for local security from the military, warrants and evidence were 
introduced to execute arrest and search operations according to law. Fulfilling 
these kinds of legal requirements was also an important means to educate the 
police force and judicial system. As a result of this shift, the TFs needed to better 
manage the balance between training, mentoring, and operations. TF mentoring 
teams, together with partner units from the local police and representatives of 
the judicial system, tried to build a workable and sustainable judicial system led 
by intelligence. Warrants and evidence became prerequisites to prosecute a target 
or conduct an operation. 
This article shares a best-practice model for operations and intelligence fu-
sion and uses a case study to describe how a small-nation SOF TF might apply 
an operation-intelligence fusion plan that combines military planning and 
processes with a law enforcement mindset. It describes a simple model of the 
Commander’s Critical Information Requirement and a “fusion tool” in the form 
of a pie chart that can be used by the planning staff to assess, plan, and direct 
resources for both intelligence operations and strike operations.1
Evidence-Based Operation in Afghanistan
The following vignette illustrates the relationship between a particular ISAF 
SOF task force and the Afghan provincial response company (PRC) it mentored 
and trained between 2009 and 2012. In support of the local prosecutor, the PRC 
contributed to a forensic database of IED components and types that eventually 
supplied the prosecutor with sufficient evidence to identify and convict several 
bomb makers.
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The Relationship and Tasks 
The SOF TF staff of seven officers, including specialists in operations, intel-
ligence, logistics, and communications, had been working with a SWAT-like PRC 
for over four years. The PRC functioned as a crisis response unit in addition to 
conducting deliberate arrest and search operations. A mutual process for quick 
reaction operations (with a standard notification to move in 15 minutes) allowed 
the TF to launch immediately with the PRC. The ISAF regional commander, the 
regional command staff, and the battle space owner, along with the Afghan chain 
of command (including the prosecutor) were notified at the same time. 
Although the PRC was almost fully operationally capable when it was directed 
to undertake the operation described below, the TF had assigned two advisors 
and mentors to each of the three PRC platoon leaders. Moreover, the TF ground 
force commander advised the PRC company commander, while the SOF TF 
commander advised and assisted the provincial chief of police in the use of the 
PRC. The local situation also called for some “mission creep”: the provincial 
prosecutor needed support to carry out his duties, so the SOF TF helped him 
with training and education in the rule of law as well as with matters regarding 
the use of evidence. 
Deliberate operational planning was initiated sometimes by the Afghan partner 
and sometimes by the SOF TF. Over time, both the PRC and the provincial police 
chief had begun to initiate investigations and launch arrest operations and even 
conduct unilateral operations with minimum oversight by the SOF TF. The delib-
erate planning process followed ISAF’s normal standard operational procedures 
to get CONOPS approval. Three to four operations per week, including quick 
responses, were the norm. 
The Background
By the summer of 2009, the Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Improvised Explo-
sive Device, and Weapons Intelligence sections of the ISAF Provincial Recon-
struction Team (PRT) in the province had started to collect data about IEDs for 
a database, at a time when insurgents had started to use IEDs more frequently. 
These sections and the explosives experts in the PRT had been working closely 
with other centralized anti-IED sections within ISAF to build cases for and 
increase knowledge about the IED threat. The building of this database became 
a key factor in their later success.
In the early fall of 2009, the PRT conducted a company-sized operation in a 
village in one of the province’s problem areas. The team secured IED components 
and other evidence and sent it all in to be analyzed against the database. Unfor-
tunately, there was no match, but the database, which was about two years old 
at the time, was updated with the new data. This process had by now become 
standard protocol, and occasionally a match was found that connected an 
individual to a device, but only rarely could the specific insurgent or IED maker 
be fixed at a certain time and place.
Several weeks later, the SOF TF, working very closely with the fusion cell at the 
regional command headquarters, as well as with the PRT’s intelligence section 
and other units, identified three suspected insurgents and IED facilitators in 
the same area where the PRT’s infantry company usually operated. The Afghan 
ONLY RARELY 
COULD THE SPECIFIC 
INSURGENT OR IED 
MAKER BE FIXED 




provincial prosecutor had already issued warrants for two of the three suspects. 
The third individual’s warrant was in process but not ready to be executed. One 
of the suspected insurgents was considered more of a priority, but the TF could 
not make a positive identification (PID) because they had only a vague physical 
description of him. The homes of the three suspects were known, down to the 
exact house; they were known to be part of the same network; and they went 
regularly to evening prayers in the village mosque. But the men themselves were 
not fixed—there was other information suggesting that the pattern of life (POL) 
of each insurgent had not been confirmed. The prosecutor had firm evidence 
on the second most 
important suspect, 
Suspect Y, but neither 
he nor the police as a 
whole, including the 
National Directorate 
of Security in the 
province, had such 
firm evidence on the 
other suspects. The 
prosecutor wanted 
the three men arrested 
anyway. (See figure 1 
for a depiction of the 
target set. The use and 
development of the pie 
chart is explained later 
in the article.) 
ISAF intelligence confirmed that all of the suspects were part of an insurgent IED 
network. Everybody wanted Suspect X arrested because he was believed to be 
a network leader and was therefore the top priority. The prosecutor had issued 
a warrant for his arrest, according to the judicial process at the time. The SOF 
TF were not too concerned by the fact that evidence for Suspect X was missing; 
from their point of view, it was more likely that they and the PRC would be able 
to find, fix, and arrest Suspect Y because they had more information, including 
evidence from the prosecutor and likely also from the PRT. It was easier for the 
PRC and the TF to identity Suspect Y than the others, and he was also considered 
easier to track once he had been found and fixed. The SOF TF, as a norm, used 
the CARVER matrix—criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, 
and recognizability—to assess the target or target system.3 Suspect Y thus became 
the priority for the PRC, as well as the SOF TF at the time, based on recogniz-
ability. Both the PRC and the SOF TF believed, however, that if they could arrest 
Suspect X, it would have much more of an effect on the IED threat network. 
The deliberate planning of the operation went ahead, and it was eventually au-
thorized from the regional command level, as well as from the Afghan provincial 
chief of police. Because of the shortage of rotor-wing assets and intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support, such operations were usually 
time-based instead of trigger-based. The staff therefore estimated a time window 
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Execution and Dry Hole
Right on schedule, the PRC, along with the prosecutor and mentors and combat 
supporters from the SOF TF, landed on target in darkness. The use of rotor-wing 
aircraft was uncommon in this particular area and therefore contributed to the 
effect of speed and surprise. Suspect Z, the lowest priority of the three suspects, 
was the only one who was partially fixed at the time, following the criteria and 
processes used by the SOF TF. Notwithstanding, in a matter of minutes, Sus-
pect Y’s compound and other houses of interest were surrounded and searched 
following standard procedures and directives, which included the use of trained 
female Afghan police officers from the PRC. Seven Afghan men were found and 
held for identification using biometrics and physical description, but none was 
positively identified, so the prosecutor had to let all seven men go before the 
helicopters came to pick up the ground force and return them to base. Eventu-
ally, all the material the team had gathered in their search was systematically 
processed by various elements of the Afghan police, the SOF TF, and the PRT, as 
well as other ISAF organizations.
Exploitation and Breakthrough
After two weeks of analysis, a positive match came from a crime lab, which con-
firmed the identification of one of the seven men found on target and connected 
him with the IED component that had been found by the PRT earlier 
in the fall. Further research, however, also concluded that none of the 
seven was Suspect X, Y, or Z. This match belonged to a new suspect, 
Q, a previously unknown IED maker. The SOF TF now had everything 
it needed for a positive identification and a likely location, as well as 
confirmed evidence. Suspect Q and his likely whereabouts were known 
to the PRT troops and the infantry company’s intelligence officer, so 
the TF went to them for more information on the suspect. Suspect Q 
quickly got a pie chart of his own, to help the staff visualize and focus 
on the efforts and directives that would be needed during the planning 
and preparation phase of this new arrest operation (see figure 2). It 
was very easy to get a warrant for Suspect Q’s arrest, once the case and 
the evidence were processed and presented to the prosecutor. The TF’s 
rule-of-law subject matter expert also made considerable efforts to 
ensure that the prosecutor understood the value of certain biometric 
evidence, something which was completely new to the prosecutor and 
the Afghan court in the province. 
The findings, along with the intelligence and evidence to back them 
up, were released to the Afghans. Once again, the SOF TF staff worked 
to get the ISR and rotor-wing support the operation required, as well as 
the various CONOPS approvals. This time, however, the rotor-wing support was 
not available, and it would be too difficult and dangerous for the PRC and the 
SOF TF to go by armored vehicles into the IED-infested area where Suspect Q was 
believed to be. 
As luck would have it, the PRT infantry company was ready to conduct a 
handover-takeover with an incoming company. The SOF TF staff urged their PRT 
counterparts to make sure that the handover took place in the targeted village, in 
order to both arrest Suspect Q and conduct a road-clearing and patrol mission. 
























Figure 2: Suspect Q’s Pie Chart
SUSPECT Q QUICKLY 
GOT A PIE CHART 
OF HIS OWN. 
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the operation—were embedded in the company-plus–sized operation. After 
a couple of hours of conventional road clearing, the teams entered the village. 
Suspect Q was identified hanging around very near where the IEDs had been 
found, and where the PRC and the SOF TF had conducted their night operation 
weeks earlier, doing his business as usual while he observed the ISAF soldiers 
and local Afghan National Security Forces personnel. Suspect Q was arrested 
very smoothly and expeditiously by the Afghans, and was subsequently taken to 
police headquarters to be processed.
Aftermath
During the investigation and subsequent judicial processing of Suspect Q by the 
Afghan prosecutor, the Taliban shadow governor of the district called several 
times to insist that Suspect Q be released without trial. This had never happened 
before, so the prosecutor became even more insistent on prosecuting Suspect Q. 
During the process, the provost, the ISAF military police, and the rule-of-law 
experts from the SOF TF supported the prosecutor and police in their efforts to 
ensure a fair trial and fair treatment for Suspect Q. Eventually, Suspect Q was 
sentenced to 10 years in jail for acts of terrorism.
A Discussion of SOF Fusion
Counterterrorism organizations and units normally use a decision support tem-
plate to make decisions, and to help them understand when there is risk involved 
and when they have actionable intelligence. The decision support template 
usually consists of a high-value (high-payoff ) target list, named areas of interest, 
target areas of interest, time-phase lines, and decision points.4 This template 
is a product of the intelligence preparation of the operational environment or 
battlefield, and forms the foundation for a commander’s decision making. This 
process and the products are well known and have been available for years. The 
question remains, however, whether the template can be as useful in a conven-
tional police-led operation when the process and products have a focus other 
than terrorism or counterinsurgency.
A Decision-Making Model
Normally, the decision points are made up of what is known as the Command-
er’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). The CCIR consists primarily 
of Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and Friendly Forces Intelligence 
Requirements (FFIR). A PIR can be broken down into Specific Intelligence 
Requests, which can be broken down even further into Essential Elements of 
Information. Several elements of a Specific Intelligence Request might go into 
the PIR that the TF uses to positively identify a person behind an attack on 
coalition forces, including 
 ¡ the person’s physical description, 
 ¡ the person’s biometrics, and 
 ¡ a recent photograph of the person.
The SOF TF had developed, over the years, a simple formula to enable more 
rapid decision making and also to push the level of decision making down to the 
operators as much as possible, to help maintain the initiative and tempo. The 
formula is: DP = CCIR = (PIR + FFIR). That is, the commander, or whoever has 
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the authority, can make a decision based on information regarding the enemy 
and the enemy’s condition set plus information regarding his own forces and 
their condition set. To support and further develop the results, the SOF TF used a 
formula similar to this: If (PIR) and (FFIR), then (DP) (see figure 3).
There can be several PIRs and FFIRs that go into a decision point, depending on 
the outcome of the planning and war gaming processes. The operations officer or 
section is responsible for developing information for their own or other friendly 
forces’ FFIR. The intelligence officer or section is responsible for developing what 
the organization needs to know regarding the adversary—the PIR. This distinc-
tion is important because it normally takes longer to collect and estimate the en-
emy’s condition and courses of action than it does to develop one’s own courses 
of action. The operations section usually already has all the information it needs 
regarding its own forces, organization, equipment, and strengths and weaknesses 
compared to the enemy. Therefore, intelligence planning and preparation can be 
characterized by proactivity, foreknowledge, patience, and reflection. 
The information and intelligence support the commander’s decision making. 
Because this particular SOF TF normally consisted of a small staff, its team mem-
bers developed another simple tool that would enable the planning and direction 
of their operation-intelligence fusion to be both creative and organized. This 
tool is, foremost, a matter of approach and mindset. It has become somewhat 
irrelevant within the TF to argue whether intelligence drives operations or 
operations drive intelligence. One way to settle this is to decide that intelligence 
drives the commander and the commander drives operations. The norm, if there 
is no consensus regarding intelligence collection, is that the intelligence officer 
has the final say on why and what, while the operations officer has the final say 
on how and when. It helps if the staff officers see themselves as combinations of 
operations/intelligence or intelligence/operations, depending on their primary 
function, rather than being categorized into stovepiped sections or functions. 
Analysis of a Manhunt 
The team developed a color-coded pie-chart tool to consolidate 
information and allow decision makers to have a common under-
standing and awareness of a target (see figure 4). The pie chart depicts 
the information required to make a decision on whether to take action 
against the target. The information is color-coded to indicate how 
much information and knowledge is available regarding a certain target. 
Red means no or little information, yellow means the requirement is 
partially satisfied, and green means it is fully satisfied. In general, when 
the information requirements have been satisfied, and especially if there 
is a positive identification and the target location is known or will be 
known, the organization can prosecute the target with an expectation 
of success, if it so chooses. 
In the example provided in figure 4, the target is a person, and the 
information that has been assessed as important is as follows:
 ¡ Positive ID: Is the person identified? Does the organization have a 
picture, description, or biometrics, and so on? 
 ¡ Means of transportation: What cars, motorcycles, trains, and other 

















Figure 3: SOF TF  





























 ¡ Locations: What are the home, work, and other addresses associated with 
the target? 
 ¡ Associated persons: Who are the targeted person’s closest friends, co-
workers, and relatives? These individuals can become the subject of a pie 
chart of their own. 
 ¡ Background information: What schools has the targeted person attended? 
What level of education has he achieved? What is his social status? What 
are his interests, and so on? 
 ¡ Activity: What does the target do, and why?
 ¡ Patterns of life: How and when does the target move? Where does he go, 
and what does he do? 
In the example of Suspect Q, positive identification and locations were priorities, 
along with the suspect’s pattern of life. Using this pie chart, the small TF staff 
could plan, discuss, analyze, and direct resources, depending on what informa-
tion was still missing. If there was not enough information to positively identify 
a target, then the next objective for the intelligence resources would be to collect 
that particular type of information. 
Furthermore, as in Suspect Q’s case, the pie chart can be modified depending on 
what the staff consider important. For instance, the focus of counterinsurgency 
in Afghanistan in recent years moved from military operations towards police 
operations. Police operations are subject to investigations and a regular judicial 
process. Arrest and search operations require warrants and preferably some 
kind of evidence to present in court. In the case of Suspect Q, the warrants and 
evidence against the target were considered FFIR. Figure 5 presents the positive 
identification, locations, and pattern of life of Suspect Q as PIR.
Such evidence could obviously be intelligence-related, but in this particular case 
it was important to be able to present the evidence openly in court, and for it 
to come from someone outside of the TF or the partnered PRC unit. Also, the 
target might already be wanted for questioning or already have been arrested in 
conjunction with ongoing criminal activity, in which case the available evidence 
might not be intelligence-related. Evidence is a prerequisite for a warrant: 
without substantial evidence, there would most likely be no warrant, and 
without the warrant, the PRC would not be able to execute the operation. 
In Suspect Q’s case, however—like so many other TF operations—a warrant was 
issued for a search or an arrest with the aim to “hopefully” find some evidence 
on location that could be used in court. Before the analytical model described 
in this article was developed, on multiple occasions, the suspected targets were 
released without charges because of lack of evidence or some other culturally or 
politically sensitive reason. This hit-or-miss approach changed after the judicial 
system became more mature and its officials better understood the rudiments of 
the rule of law. The process needs to start with information, which is developed 
into intelligence and confirmed with evidence. The only alternative is to secure 
evidence from an existing crime scene, as was the case with Suspect Q and the 
IED that led to his identification. 
In the example illustrated by figure 5, a warrant has been issued and the target’s 
activity and pattern of life are well-known; these areas are colored green. The 
information requirements for positive identification, location, and evidence, 














Figure 5: Modified 
Decision-Point Pie 
Chart for Police-Led 
Operation
A WARRANT WAS 
ISSUED WITH THE 
AIM TO “HOPEFULLY” 
FIND SOME EVIDENCE 
ON LOCATION.
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situation depicted in figure 5, it becomes apparent that 
any decision to make a search, arrest, or strike will have 
to involve some risk. With this model, a commander can 
visualize and understand where there are risks based on 
whether sufficient information is available for each factor. 
Furthermore, figure 5 suggests that if no more evidence 
can be collected, then most likely the detained person 
or target of interest will be released. On the one hand, 
although the operation may be deemed worth conducting, 
if there is no reliable target description or confirmation that 
the target is present and if there is a danger that the opera-
tion might not uncover enough evidence for the prosecutor 
to continue the investigation, then the decision to act can 
be considered to have a moderate risk of failure. On the 
other hand, if the target is fixed, located, and positively 
identified (all green), and there is sufficient evidence 
(green), then it is almost certain the target will be arrested 
with enough evidence to go to court and get a conviction. 
The Decision Tree: Combining It All into  
One Picture
A decision tree that combines the different phases of an 
operation with the If-And-Then model to identify deci-
sion points and outcomes might look like figure 6.
There are essentially two decisions to be made in this 
example. From the find-phase, assuming the target is 
present and confirmed, the operation can move into 
a fix-phase and finally a finish-phase (the yellow-star 
decision points). If the target is not confirmed but the 
location is confirmed, then resources can be allocated to 
confirm the pattern of life and/or target refinement (the 
blue-star decision points). 
Once the target is confirmed and positively identified, 
then the pie chart sections for identification and location 
will be colored green, indicating that the threshold and risk, 
as well as the uncertainty, are lower compared to the find-
phase. The decision maker can therefore make a better and 
more conscious decision to move into the finish-phase and 
strike in order to arrest the target. Evidence, in this case, is 
still only partially satisfied (yellow). It is likely that there 
will be evidence at the target location or that the target 
will confess. While the TF could support the prosecutor’s 
decision-making process using the pie chart and other 
tools, it is ultimately the prosecutor’s decision whether to 
act. In this particular example (figure 6), the prosecutor 
has already issued a warrant (indicated by the color green) 
and wants the suspect in custody. The operation has 
been focused to lower the uncertainty by enhancing or 
conducting target refinement, and developing actionable 
intelligence from that information.
Conclusion: Some Key Take-Aways
Operators should always use processes their team is 
familiar with, but they should also be prepared to alter 














IF: HQ X confirmed
AND: Intelligence resources 
available
AND:  Time is allowing
THEN:  Redirect for exploit 
in order to confirm POL
IF: Located HQ X 
IF: DM is present
AND: Intelligence resources 
available
THEN:  Allocated resources 
IOT
FIX DM or Confirm HQ X
IF: DM is confirmed
AND: Strike resources 
available
AND:  Time is allowing
AND:  Authorities are in place
THEN: Redirect for trigger
in order to strike
IF: DM is confirmed/PID
AND: Strike resources are set
AND:  Authorities are in place
THEN:  Strike
IF: POL is established
IF:  Activity confirmed
AND:  Time is allowing
THEN: Redirect for FIX 
in order to set condition 
for strike
IF:  DM is PID
IF:  SE is complete
AND:  Strike is completed
AND:  Time is allowing
THEN:  Hand over site
FIND EXPLOITFINISHFIX
Figure 6: Example of Decision Points for Suspect W, Combined with Phases and Models
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mission or the problem. The If-And-Then formula needs to be developed further 
and used to support the current ops or the battle captain’s decision making if 
the commander is not available to provide the authorities to act. The conduct of 
military operations, which are usually planned over a long period of time using 
all the available intelligence resources to develop an understanding of the target 
and the mission, is still quite different from a police force’s quick-reaction, event-
driven, and often evidence-based operations, in which operators can end up at a 
location without knowing what is going on or what they may encounter.
The SOF TF staff always held an open brainstorming forum to plan operations, 
and let people who were not part of the core planning team excuse themselves 
whenever they felt they were no longer needed. The pie chart has proven to 
be a good working tool for operations and intelligence fusion, which allows 
the operations and intelligence officers and staff to work out their priorities 
together and develop a common understanding of the situation. The fields 
in the pie chart can be changed depending on the operation and its particular 
friendly-force information and priority intelligence requirements. This approach, 
along with a fusion mindset, are key to working smarter and putting the focus 
on unity of effort instead of rivalry. For the SOF TF described in this article, the 
interagency and combined approach came into effect in a way that exceeded 
all expectations. The TF members learned a great deal from this experience and 
continue to refine their methods and processes so they can work smarter and 
better. It is hoped that the Afghan partner force also gained something from the 
experience of working with the SOF TF’s methods. ²
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
The author is a European SOF operations and intelligence officer currently 
studying at the US Naval Postgraduate School.
This is a work of the US federal government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 
United States. Foreign copyrights may apply.
NOTES
1  Deployable Training Division Joint Staff J7, Commander’s Critical Information Requirements 
(CCIRs), 3rd ed. (Suffolk, Va.: Deployable Training Division, July 2013): http://www.dtic.
mil/doctrine/fp/fp_ccirs.pdf
2  All figures in the article were developed by the author.
3  Army National Guard Battle Command Training Center, Battle Staff Guide: A Reference Tool 
for Commanders and Battle Staffs (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Army National Guard, August 
2010), 347: http://www.benning.army.mil/mcoe/dot/mc3/reserve/content/pdf/Battle%20
Staff%20Guide_Aug2010.pdf
4 US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, Combat Commanders Handbook on 
Intelligence, ST 2-50.4/FM 34-8 (Huachuca, Ariz.: USAIC&FH, 6 September 2001): 
https://fas.org/irp/agency/army/st2-50-4.pdf
THE PIE CHART HAS 
PROVEN TO BE A GOOD 




CTX | Vol. 6, No. 1
THE CTAP INTERVIEW
The Return of the Zarqawists: How to  
Deal with the Islamic State Movement 
Edited by Ian C. Rice and  
Craig Whiteside,  
US Naval Postgraduate School
On 20 August 2015, the Defense Analysis Department, the Naval 
War College Monterey, and the Global Education Community Collaboration 
Online (Global ECCO) hosted a panel at the US Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) titled “The Islamic State: Remaining and Expanding?”1 The five research-
ers on the panel discussed the Islamic State (ISIS) from different perspectives and 
then took questions from the audience. The panelists were 
 ¡ Major Jon Baker, a US Army Special Forces officer and student at NPS;2
 ¡ Brian Fishman, a counterterrorism research fellow with the New America 
think tank in Washington, D.C.;
 ¡ Dr. Haroro Ingram, a professor at the Australian National University; 
 ¡ Dr. Casey Lucius, a former professor of National Security Affairs with 
the Naval War College Monterey; and 
 ¡ Dr. Doug Ollivant, a managing partner at the consulting firm Mantid 
International.
Editor’s Introduction 
The purpose of the panel was to answer a series of questions about the Islamic 
State movement’s return from near-defeat in 2007–2008. How was it able to 
return, and what were the factors that allowed its rise? What is the nature of the 
organization and its ideology? What aspects of insurgency, counterinsurgency, 
and irregular warfare are present in this current conflict? At what level should 
the United States be involved? Finally, how do we defeat the robust capability of 
the Islamic State movement in the realm of information operations?
NOTE: We use the name “ISIS” throughout the discussion to refer to the move-
ment that is alternatively called ISIL, Daesh, and the Islamic State. When referring 
to the generic movement over time, we use the term “Islamic State movement.”3
The Panel: The Islamic State—Remaining or Expanding? 
QUESTION: What is the nature of the Islamic State movement? Is it an insurgency, 
a terrorist group, or a state? How did it develop into the organization it is today?
DR. BRIAN FISHMAN: I’ll give a brief run-through of the history—and more 
recent development—of ISIS, starting in 2007, which is the later period in the 
progression of this organization. I’m going to start with the phrase “remaining 
and expanding.” The reason people use the word “remain” with regard to ISIS 
is because ISIS leaders talk about how it still remains. The Arabic word for this 
is baqiya. There is a famous passage that ISIS folks refer to again and again, to 
this day, that talks about how the State [referring to the Dawlah Islamiyah, or 
“Islamic State” in Arabic] still remains, despite all of the pressure from so many 
different places. In the very narrow world of the jihadi, there is a very famous 
paragraph in a speech given by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, who was the first emir of 
the Islamic State of Iraq [ISI]. [He was appointed in October 2006.] At this time 
the [Anbar] Awakening was just getting off the ground, the US troop surge was 
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just starting to get off the ground, but ISI already felt heavy 
pressure from those events as early as spring 2007.4 Abu 
Omar said the Islamic State of Iraq would remain: “It will 
remain safe because it has been built on the body remains of 
martyrs; it has been watered with their blood streams.”5 That 
quote still shows up in ISIS propaganda over and over again. 
We measure ISIS in lots of different ways to try to deter-
mine whether we are winning or losing. But I would say, 
from their perspective, they set the bar low: ISIS will 
remain—in the sense of ISIS continuing to be a powerful 
force. Continuing to be something that is worth fighting 
for. That’s not the bar of what they want to achieve, it’s 
the bar that says, “We are not defeated so long as we still 
exist.” In June 2010, [US Army Chief of Staff ] General Ray 
Odierno said, “Well, over the last 90 days we have killed 
34 out of 42 of the Islamic State of Iraq’s top leaders.” 
That was the primary metric the US military was using to 
understand the success we were having against this group. 
The ISI rejoinder during that period was “The Islamic State 
will remain. We are still fighting and we will continue to 
fight.” I think we have to recognize that we are using a 
different set of metrics to measure how weak this organiza-
tion is compared to the metrics that ISIS is using. What 
our metrics ought to be, I don’t know, but I think that is 
something to think about. 
So the subtext of all of that is these guys think they have 
existed [as ISI or ISIS] since October 2006—not just 
since the Syrian civil war began, not just since they took 
over Mosul last year. We continued to call them al Qaeda 
in Iraq until they declared themselves to be ISIS or ISIL, 
crossed into Syria, and separated themselves formally 
from al Qaeda. But, if you look at the statements by 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, by Abu Faraj al-Libi—all the senior 
leaders in al Qaeda—in 2006 and through late 2007, 
they acknowledged that no, there was no such thing as 
al Qaeda in Iraq anymore. There was just the Islamic State 
of Iraq. We interpreted al Qaeda in Iraq’s declaration of 
an Islamic State of Iraq as a rebranding exercise rather 
than a definitive political shift in the kinds of things that 
they wanted to accomplish. I think that from that early 
point they wanted to build this state. I think that Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi wanted to build an Islamic State and 
was preparing to declare it even before he was killed. So 
you have this dynamic where the state gets declared in 
October 2006, and al Qaeda acknowledges that but still 
wants to exert influence over it. 
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MAJOR JOHN BAKER: ISIS is the evolution of a brutal organization that first 
formed in Iraq in 2002. Driven by a Salafi jihadist ideology [not the popularly 
ascribed Ba’athist influence], ISIS has a history of brutal actions directed at 
punishing the Iraqi Shi’a populace, which it views as apostates. The extreme 
ideology is likely not representative of the natural preference of the collective 
Sunni population in Iraq. The Awakening movement, the Sahwa, demonstrated 
that moderate Sunnis were present and willing to participate in efforts to under-
mine Zarqawi’s version of Salafi jihad. With the end of the US mission in Iraq, 
however, this effort lost sponsorship and was quickly eroded from within by the 
remaining vanguard of the ISI. Subsequently, the Islamic State of Iraq entrenched 
itself in the social, political, and economic fibers of the Sunni population. The ISI 
revolutionary methodology penetrated tribal dynamics: collecting and coercing 
tribal leaders; achieving integration through marriage; manipulating lots of 
businesses; and, of course, assassination. 
ISIS has proved itself to be a resilient organization and demonstrates resolve 
routinely through the information operations [IO] realm. Because of both the 
inability of the Sahwa to sustain itself after the end of the US mission and the 
revolutionary methodology of ISIS, there is at present little alternative for the 
Sunni population to turn to. The bandwagoning effect and fear of repercussions 
discourages the Sunni populace from betraying ISIS for a system that might align 
more closely with their natural preferences. Pockets of Sunni resistance exist, but 
how long can they endure?
ISIS as a Network
FISHMAN: If you look [at our efforts to defeat the ISI movement] from 2009 to 
2010, when we were making tactical and operational progress against this organi-
zation, one of the metrics we used [to measure their viability] was whether they 
had reliable communications back to Afghanistan. In fact, they couldn’t talk to 
their senior leadership. So this debate over whether they were already operating 
as an independent entity was not just academic. It was a function of whether we 
were really measuring something that mattered at that time. We said, they have 
got to do all of their fundraising locally now, here in Iraq. But today, it’s easy in 
20/20 hindsight to look back and say that [having to rely on local extortion and 
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taxation as opposed to outside funding] actually strengthened them over the 
long run. That’s a really interesting dynamic. The other piece of this that I think 
is key, is when we think about ISIS today, we think that it developed solely out 
of the organization that was started by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, had a connec-
tion with al Qaeda, became al Qaeda in Iraq, and then spread into Syria and 
came back to Iraq. But I would posit to you that the very earliest networks that 
Zarqawi built in Iraq were [a series of ] regional networks that extended into 
Jordan and into Syria. They extended into Lebanon. And these networks never 
really went away. 
A fascinating piece of this is that we had uprisings of jihadi organizations in 
Lebanon, the most famous of which was in 2007 by a group named Fatah al-
Islam. It was largely crushed, but the people escaped. Well, [Shaker al-Abssi] led 
that uprising, [and he is the same person] who was indicted in Jordan in 2002 
for collaborating with Zarqawi to kill an American diplomat named Laurence 
Foley. Shaker was later killed by Syrian forces, but this was a man who built a 
jihadi movement in Lebanon that was training people to go to Iraq, and that was 
receiving wounded fighters from Iraq and essentially doing rehabilitation for 
them. Shaker then tried to start his own organization in northern Lebanon, and 
it spread into parts of Syria. 
The roots of these kinds of organizations still exist, and when we wonder how 
ISIS was able to explode so quickly in the context of Syria, it’s because of this 
same network in Syria. It was not only funneling foreign fighters, but there was 
this indigenous network that was moving people [on behalf of various jihadist 
groups] from Lebanon into Syria, into Iraq, and vice versa. So I think one of the 
most important dynamics of ISIS as we think of it today, or as the “Islamic State” 
with no geographic boundaries, is that it is accepting pledges of allegiance from 
organizations around the world, including in Afghanistan. This is a definitive 
change. This is, in my opinion, one of the very few definitive changes from the 
organization that it was trying to be—from 2006 forward. We have documents 
from Syrian-based logisticians in ISIS saying, “I am going to negotiate with the 
guys in Lebanon, and I am going to do the Haj in Saudi Arabia, and I am going 
to meet up with our guys in the Gaza Strip and talk to them there.” So the ISIS 
network was this underground network that [existed throughout the region]. 
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ISIS as an Insurgency 
DR. HARORO INGRAM: I [find it helpful to look at 
ISIS as] an insurgency based upon these broad kinds 
of strategic principles that it shares with thinkers like 
Mao [Zedong], Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, Abu Bakr Naji, 
and to some extent, [Abu Musab] al-Suri.6 One of these 
principles is the establishment of a fully integrated 
politico-military campaign. ISIS thinks like an insurgency, 
presenting a competitive system of control [in contrast 
to the Iraqi and Syrian governments]. Now, the thing 
about a competitive system of political control is that 
when you look at insurgencies in their strongholds, they 
look remarkably state-like. They tend 
to structuralize, to institutionalize their 
functions. Even militarily, they have 
some kind of uniforms and they set up 
police and infantry. If, however, you 
look further out from those strong- 
holds, insurgencies start to look very 
much like guerilla warfare—more 
insurgency-like. The way that the center 
interacts with those outer areas is through a functional 
political and military engagement. Militarily, they use 
guerilla warfare tactics, hit and run, those kinds of things, 
but certainly politically and socially, the way they operate 
is that the tax-man will appear, and he is just a guy who is 
carrying a gun. He walks past someone and says, “Pay up.” 
That’s taxation. They will engage with these populations 
functionally, with the differences between the areas being 
whether those functions are formalized in what we could 
call structures or institutions.
ISIS as a Pseudo-State
DR. CASEY LUCIUS: States have certain capabilities that 
terrorist organizations don’t have. Most terrorist organiza-
tions carry out physical attacks for a political aim, but 
once that political aim is achieved, they don’t necessarily 
have a desire to govern territory. ISIS is different with 
regard to what they want: they have political aims, they 
carry out physical attacks, but they also have the will to 
govern territory, to govern people. They also want to be 
recognized as a state, both on maps and internationally, 
and they have the ability to use multiple tools of power—
information, political, military, and so on. We know 
that they have significant economic 
tools [extraction of taxes from locals, 
oil infrastructure]. So, in many ways, 
I think ISIS has the characteristics of a 
state, and if we treat them as a state, it 
opens up a range of policy options for 
dealing with them. Instead of thinking 
the only options are either to engage or 
not engage, it opens up the scope, and 
we can say, What do we do with this state? We negotiate, 
we impose economic sanctions, we attack the state’s 
military, we isolate them, and we encircle them, or maybe 
apply a multipronged approach and do all of those things 
at the same time.
ISIS and Its Relationship with Shi’a States
FISHMAN: What is the relationship between the Assad 
regime and ISIS? It’s absolutely indisputable that ISIS 
hates Shi’a Muslims—they have hated the Iranian and 
Syrian governments for years as a result of that sectarian 
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perspective. At the same time, ISIS would not be what it is today if the Iranians 
didn’t tolerate its networks operating back and forth between Iraq and Afghani-
stan for years. It’s a fact that Iran allowed a range of different jihadi organizations 
to operate on its territory going back into the 1990s, mostly because the jihadis 
were hostile to Arab governments in the region, including the Saudis and the 
Egyptians, and so Iran allowed them to operate. 
As for Syria, it’s even more interesting. I mentioned Shaker al Abssi, who was 
a key ally of Zarqawi. Before the Syrian government killed him back in 2008, 
Shaker was part of a jihadi organization sponsored directly by the Syrian govern-
ment in Lebanon. So why was the Syrian government doing that? Well, they 
weren’t doing it because they actually supported these guys’ goals. They were sup-
porting pseudo-jihadi groups in Lebanon because they didn’t want Palestinian 
organizations to get too powerful. So they were going to do anything they could 
to divide those movements. The radical would-be jihadi organizations would go 
to war against secular Palestinians as well as Palestinian Islamists like Hamas. So 
the Syrian government was playing all of these people against each other. When 
we look at Syria today, I don’t believe there is this tight relationship between the 
Syrian government and ISIS that some people say exists. But it’s absolutely true 
that the Syrian government over the years has supported radical groups, takfiri 
groups, in order to divide other opposition movements. That’s just what they do. 
It is the playbook. So it’s not surprising that in the first years of the Syrian civil 
war, the Syrian government would focus on fighting insurgent organizations that 
were not ISIS because they knew that ISIS would divide the insurgency. That’s not 
some new strategy—that’s what they have always done. The best place to see that 
is in Lebanon. 
ISIS as a Global Threat
LUCIUS: Is ISIS a threat to our national interests? To answer this question, first, 
you identify national interests. Second, you identify your goals. Third, you 
identify your policy options. Using this approach, and starting with our national 
interests, I turn to Hans Morgenthau, who wrote, in his book In Defense of the 
National Interest, that the national interest should be the standard by which we 
develop policy.7 In other words, policy should not be based on what we morally 
agree or disagree with. Policy should not be based on what we can afford or can’t 
afford or what public opinion polls say. Specifically, Morgenthau suggested that 
moral principles in the international sphere have no concrete universal meaning, 
and he warned that without consistency in foreign policy, decision makers 
will simply demonize the enemy, rather than recognize the real threat and 
the opposing state’s real power. This raises two big questions about ISIS. First, 
Morgenthau says that we should focus on interests, not morals. So, what I think 
he would say in regard to ISIS is that no matter how horrific ISIS’s actions are, no 
matter how morally reprehensible we find these actions, our reaction should not 
be the basis of our policy. I think that’s at least worth thinking about. We should 
allow that to sink in and inform the policy process. 
The second question is [the threat]. We don’t want to just demonize our 
enemy—we want to focus on what the real threat is and [what ISIS’s capabilities 
are to harm or oppose any of our vital interests]. So I identify six vital inter-
ests: trade and economic prosperity; energy supply; freedom of the seas; space 
access; cyber security; and homeland security. Again, we could talk about what 
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those six actually mean and go on forever about whether those really are vital 
interests and what they encompass. But in terms of how that list relates to ISIS, I 
would submit that it could be our baseline to try to answer that question: does 
ISIS threaten our national interests? I will say ISIS does not threaten our trade 
supply, freedom of the seas, or space access. I will go on to suggest there is not 
an immediate threat to our energy supply or cyber security, although I do think 
there is possibility over time that the threat could grow. I would, however, 
submit that ISIS is a threat to our homeland security. The reason I say this is that 
[ISIS’s own stated goals] are to expand its territory across the Middle East, Asia, 
and Africa; to recruit Westerners; and to attack the West and the United States. 
So, if we use that list of six national interests we can say okay, there may be one 
national interest that is actually threatened by ISIS.
FISHMAN: I think it’s pretty clear that ISIS’s strategy for engaging the West aims 
to inspire people there to do homegrown attacks. That’s not always been the case, 
and it’s also true that ISIS’s predecessors have, at least rhetorically, had their eye 
on the West for longer than is usually understood.8 In 2008, Abu Ayyub al-Masri 
was the minister of war in the Islamic State of Iraq, and he claimed credit for a 
bombing attack on the Glasgow airport in Scotland. Now, how much exactly did 
ISI [influence the perpetrators to act]? Did they actually drive that kind of attack 
in the West? It’s hard to know. But I think that there is a lot to the idea that 
they had some influence on it. Most importantly though, this organization had 
its eyes on something bigger than just Iraq much earlier than we have generally 
given it credit for. I think that as we combat this group, it’s important for us to 
understand that its leaders measure their legacy in those terms.
Dealing with Sectarianism in Iraqi Politics
QUESTION: ISIS’s leadership must be credited with developing a successful 
strategy that facilitated its growth in support among the Sunni community. 
But this can only be part of the story. The return of the Islamic State movement 
Glasgow airport bombing, 30 June 2007.
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occurred in a political environment in Iraq that created the conditions for it to 
grow. How did this happen?
DR. DOUG OLLIVANT: The Iraqi government is a weak and largely dysfunctional 
one. It is also a democratic and representative one. Of course, those two aspects 
are intertwined. Democratic and representative governments have a hard time 
getting things done. It is difficult in a democracy to make things happen. They 
are inefficient by design. This is a problem now that Iraq is in a crisis. Iraq has 
what we call a national unity government, which means that all parties are rep-
resented in the executive. National unity governments, even within the subset of 
democracies, are on the least functional side of the spectrum. I think the only na-
tional unity government in the history of mankind that worked well was [British 
Prime Minister Winston] Churchill’s government during the Second World 
War, and all it was doing was to focus on fighting the war. The government 
postponed all other concerns about what was going on at home. To understand 
the national unity government, I give this example: imagine if, in the current 
Barack Obama administration, four ministries—including one or two important 
ones like State, Interior, or Treasury—were controlled by Republicans who 
reported to Karl Rove or some similar figure.9 What if President Obama had to 
work with a cabinet that included people who were quite intent on making sure 
his government did not function effectively? I tell people that government is 
hard to make function effectively even when everyone is dedicated and trying to 
make it function effectively. When some people are trying to ensure that it does 
not function effectively, that’s actually very easy to do. 
So, we are in a situation right now where we actually have some fairly decent 
leaders in the current Iraqi government. By decent, I mean well-meaning—I 
don’t mean particularly capable. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi is Western-
oriented and spent his exile in London. He and the people he has surrounded 
himself with come from the London-exile branch of the Da’wa party, while 
[former Prime Minister] Nouri al-Maliki and the previous group came from US Army General William B. Caldwell (r) 
displays a photo of Abu Ayyub al Masri.
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those who spent their exile in Damascus and Iran. Abadi 
speaks fluent English, and he used to work for Hewlett 
Packard in London, where he was a technocrat. He also 
got 5,000 votes in the last election—not a huge support 
base for him to draw on—whereas, I believe, Maliki got 
850,000. Abadi’s most senior Sunni counterpart, Dr. 
Salim al-Jabouri, who is the speaker of the Iraqi parlia-
ment, comes out of the Muslim Brotherhood but has tried 
to leave that behind and is presenting himself as a more 
moderate and conciliatory figure. Both Dr. al-Jabouri and 
Prime Minister Abadi, I believe, are trying to reach out 
and cut a deal. The issue, of course, is that both of them 
have problems with their base. You know—and this is 
something that current congressional leaders in Wash-
ington can also understand—just because you’re trying to 
get a deal, it doesn’t mean that you can bring all of your 
backbenchers along with you. 
BAKER: In response to the sectarian attacks that began in 
2004, the Shi’a popular movements became increasingly 
violent and influential within the Baghdad government. 
The Iraqi security forces (ISF), which 
were predominantly Shi’a during the US 
involvement, had become increasingly 
homogeneous, and Shi’a popular move-
ments are suspected of having infiltrated 
these organizations. The uniformed ISF 
was unable either to control the Sunni 
population or protect the Shi’a popula-
tion; thus, the security gap inspired the 
actions of the Shi’a popular movements. 
Furthermore, Sunni participation in the 
Baghdad government is likely less than wholly mean-
ingful. It is either too small to be influential within the 
national political realm, or participation in the govern-
ment taints the authenticity of the individuals as repre-
sentatives of Sunni causes. These factors have combined 
to create what I consider to be centrifugal forces within 
the Islamic State and Shi’a popular movements—giving 
alleged legitimacy to each other’s atrocities.
OLLIVANT: There is a fundamental question we need to 
ask [about how much the sectarian issue affects the rise of 
the Islamic State movement]. Clearly the Sunni citizens of 
Iraq perceive that they are being deprived and persecuted, 
that they are not getting what is due them, and are on the 
receiving end of violence and oppression and imprison-
ment more than others around them. The question is, how 
much of this is real, and how much of this is perceived? If 
the persecution is real, then something can be done about 
it. If the persecution is largely perceived, then it’s very 
difficult to know what the government might do. 
Let me give a counter narrative to that. In the last elec-
tion, the Sunni parties won 19% of the parliamentary 
seats in Iraq. [When we talk about the major divisions of 
Iraqis]—Sunni, Shi’a, Kurds—the impression is that they 
are divided 1/3–1/3–1/3. It’s absolutely not the case. The 
country is 2/3 Shi’a, approximately 1/6 Arab Sunni, and 
1/6 Kurdish Sunni. The Shi’a population is somewhere 
between 60% and 70% of the country. So you start to 
understand that when you deal with the Shi’a majority, 
you are dealing with a huge part of the population. When 
people say this government is Shi’a-dominated, well, if it’s 
about 70% Shi’a, that’s demographically proportionate. 
You have to remember that. So again, the Sunni won 
about 19% of the seats. From those 19% of the seats, they 
had 30% of the ministries. 
There has been lots of talk about the Sunni in the security 
institutions being purged. The Iraqi government does not 
release demographic percentages of its rank and file, so we 
don’t know what they are. They did release the names of 
the top 20 military officials and what sect and nationality 
they come from. Again, we find the 
Sunni Arabs dramatically overrepre-
sented relative to their proportion in 
the population. So we have to ask the 
question: is their sense of oppression 
real, or is it simply that they are no 
longer getting the disproportionate 
amount of the goods and services and 
attention and jobs and prestige and 
positions that they enjoyed during the 
prior regime? Should we think of them 
in the same vein that we think of the Kosovar Serbs or the 
Afrikaners and the English in South Africa? Sunnis are 
simply never going to enjoy the advantages they once had, 
and they need to reconcile themselves to their new place 
in society. I think that is an open question. I don’t like the 
fact that most people seem to think it’s settled. 
The United States as an Ally
OLLIVANT: Very quickly, let me talk about Iraqis’ percep-
tion of the United States. When I travel Iraq and talk to 
the Iraqi people about the United States, the first thing 
they will tell me is that the United States is a remarkably 
unreliable ally. This is the story they will tell. ISIS came 
through in June of last year, swept down through Mosul, 
pushed down to Tikrit, and took the territory we all know 
about. In the Iraqis’ telling, which is remarkably accurate, 
the Iranians essentially showed up the next day, asking, 
“How can we help?” They provided advisors, provided 
weapons, provided training; they were there for the Iraqis. 
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The United States said, “This looks a lot like a Sunni 
uprising against oppression to us, and we really think the 
Maliki regime is the problem, and we are not doing any-
thing until the Maliki regime is removed.” Or, as I put it to 
other people, when Iraq found itself in a crisis, the United 
States, rightly or wrongly, decided that it was time to 
burn political capital in order to accomplish our foreign 
policy objectives in Iraq and get rid of Nouri al-Maliki. 
And we accomplished that. The Iranians decided that this 
would be a really, really good time to bank political capital; 
therefore, the current outcome in which Iranian influence is 
clearly waxing where American influence is waning, should 
be utterly predictable. Who would you prefer to have as an 
ally? The one who is there, or the one who says, “Well, once 
you meet all my conditions, then I will think about it.” So, 
that’s a very real perception problem. To those of us who 
might have spent two or three years 
of our life there, this might stick 
in our craw a little bit, but none-
theless, it’s a very real perception 
among the Iraqi populace. 
The second thing I hear is that 
there is an extremely strong 
perception, particularly in the 
Shi’a south, that the United 
States sponsors ISIS. Now, as I 
tell people, this comes in what 
I call strong versions and weak 
versions. In the strong version, 
the United States has a fleet of 
black helicopters that are flying 
into ISIS-controlled territory and 
providing them with a resupply 
of money, weapons, and fighters. 
As I tell any Iraqi who tells me 
this, “That’s just crazy talk. The 
United States is clearly not doing this.” And we go back 
and forth. When you can push them off that narrative, 
though, they will start to peel back to what I call a warm 
moderate version that goes something like this: “Look, 
we know that ISIS is getting aid, money, fighters, weapons, 
certainly ideology, from American allies.” They will name 
them: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey. “These are US 
allies. You provide them all a lot of money, you provide 
them support, and they are either NATO allies or major 
non-NATO allies of yours. You have influence with them. 
If you wanted to, you could make them stop. Since you are 
not making them stop, perhaps you are engineering this 
behind the scenes and using these three states as cutouts 
to do your bidding and support ISIS.” As I tell people, 
that’s wrong—but it’s not crazy. That is a reasonable 
interpretation of facts on the ground. For people who 
aren’t privy to what actually happens in the United States 
government—those of us who have been in the United 
States government know we could never pull off anything 
so sophisticated—you know, it’s believable to them. 
US Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq War
OLLIVANT: I think that we [the United States] are in 
a very dangerous moment right now, particularly for 
civil-military relations but also for learning the right 
lessons from Iraq. I think we have a large story line that 
has been popularized in a number of recent books on 
Iraq, and I think our last Army chief of staff also believes 
it. The story goes something like this: we invaded Iraq 
in 2003, which was probably a big mistake. We stumbled 
through 2004, 2005, and 2006 
not really knowing what we 
were doing. About the middle of 
2006—well, either in the middle 
of 2006 or on Valentine’s Day 
[February] 2007, depending on 
which version you believe—we 
figured out that things needed to 
go differently in Iraq. We started 
doing them differently. By 2008, 
thanks to the Surge and the 
Awakening and everything else 
that went along with it, we had 
AQI/ISI defeated. 
We moved into 2009 and 2010 
with great expectations, and 
then three things happened. 
Ambassador Chris Hill showed 
up on the scene; Nouri al-Maliki 
contested the 2010 election, 
eventually emerged victorious, and started persecuting the 
Sunni; and President Obama precipitously—that is the 
word usually used—withdrew the entirety of the US force 
from Iraq in 2011. Essentially, this became a “things were 
going fine until the politicians—US and Iraqi—screwed 
things up” story. “But for being stabbed in the back by 
these politicians, things would be much better in Iraq.” 
This story doesn’t make the United States look hard at 
things that it did to set Iraq up for failure. Let me give 
you one example. By October 2007, in Baghdad, we had 
recruited 40,000 sahwa (Sunni militia fighters) in Taji 
District. 40,000 of them! About the time we got to the 
15,000-point, I asked, “Hey, what are we doing here? Do 
we really need 15,000 sahwa to secure Taji District? We 
could probably do it with a lot less than this.” Of course, 
Nouri al-Maliki, former Prime Minister of Iraq
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the response was, “More is better.” More is better. We ended up with 40,000 
sahwa (enlisted as a security force) in Taji District by the end of 2007. How on 
earth was the Iraqi government going to integrate four divisions’ worth of sahwa 
into any type of security job? How could that possibly happen even if the Iraqi 
government wanted to do this? Let’s accept that the Iraqi government wasn’t 
really excited about it, but even had they wanted to do this, how on earth would 
they have found security jobs for 40,000 men in Taji District? I have no earthly 
idea. 
So, my point is, I think that this narrative of “we really figured everything out 
and everything was going swimmingly, and then these politicians—American 
and Iraqi—betrayed us” is keeping us from looking hard at the things that the 
United States military did. Again, I was the chief of plans for Multi-National 
Division Baghdad in 2007. I was in the middle of this. I am partially responsible 
for some of the things that did not go so well. I like to think that I am trying 
to be reflective about that. I think that this narrative makes it difficult for us to 
recognize the mistakes we made in 2006, 2007, and 2008 that set the conditions 
for the failures that came later.
QUESTION: What are our strategic objectives as a nation concerning ISIS? Is 
this our fight, or should regional or local actors take the lead? How should we 
proceed as a nation to secure our interests in the region?
LUCIUS: What is it that we hope to accomplish in regard to ISIS? Do we want 
to just degrade their capabilities? Do we want to contain ISIS? Do we want 
to defeat or eliminate ISIS? It’s important to consider what it is we want to 
accomplish, and it’s important to consider that before you develop the policy. 
However, the current policy of contain, degrade, and defeat are, I think, more 
specifically military objectives, and I would argue that there are also political 
objectives, economic objectives, and social objectives that we need to consider 
as well. Someone mentioned that we need to bolster the Iraqi security forces, 
for instance, but we also need some stability within the Iraqi government, we 
need a capable police force, a justice system, things like that. We need to cut off 
the Islamic State’s economic revenue. I read recently that ISIS receives between 
$3 million and $5 million a day from the sale of oil. So, there are also those eco-
nomic and political objectives that we need to consider. If ISIS is a threat to our 
national interests, then there is probably a time element that we have to consider 
as well, which means that we would want to act swiftly so as to not allow ISIS to 
continue to strengthen its own capabilities. 
BAKER: These concerns suggest four related efforts to address the problem of 
the Islamic State movement, and each comes with significant obstacles. The first 
is separating ISIS from the Sunni populace. This is essential. But given the condi-
tions, is it still a viable goal? After the defeat of the Awakening movement, is 
there still a sense of abandonment [by the United States] among Sunni moderates, 
and how do we overcome this? Are there enough surviving Sunni moderates to 
even establish a quorum? What means are available to convince Sunnis to partici-
pate in an alternative system of government, and how do we protect them? Finally, 
any grassroots movement would need support from the national strategic level. Is 
it possible to garner lasting commitment from the government of Iraq? 
The second effort is minimizing the role of Shi’a militias and building the 
capacity of the Iraqi security forces. I believe these two efforts are inexorably 
linked. The weaker the ISF becomes, the more justification exists for Shi’a militias 
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and therefore, Iranian influence. An Iranian-controlled 
militia will not be able to separate the Sunni populace 
from the Islamic State. The US mission in Iraq committed 
many troops and resources to create a new ISF that would 
be enduring. Based on the growth of the Islamic State, 
the ISF were either incapable or unable to connect with 
the populace and therefore failed. Subsequently, given 
our constrained resource environment now, how long 
will it take us to rebuild a force that is actually capable 
of accomplishing those things? Furthermore, beyond 
recording airstrikes and building up the security forces, 
what other measures do we have available to us to mitigate 
the influence of the Shi’a militias? 
The third effort, which is mostly beyond the purview of 
the US military, is to foster an inclusive and reconcilia-
tory Baghdad government. Most of this effort, again, is 
out of our hands, but this effort is the one that enables 
the first two to succeed. However, the US military is in a 
position where it can assist in this effort. What military 
actions can we take to increase the overall level of influ-
ence that the United States has with the 
government of Iraq? How do we protect 
moderates in the Iraqi government at 
the sub national level? Finally, what is 
the appetite within the government for 
reconciliation with the Sunni populace? 
Lastly, direct kinetic engagement will 
likely be a part of any strategy to combat 
ISIS, but this comes with significant 
strategic dangers. Kinetic engagements 
at the behest of the Iraqi national government without 
other measures are likely to be viewed by Sunnis as repres-
sion by the “Shi’a government” and reinforce the Islamic 
State worldview. Last week, a well-known proponent of 
counterinsurgency was here [at NPS] and argued that we 
should dramatically ramp up the amount of air strikes we 
are doing against ISIS, based on his assumption that ISIS 
fulfills most of the criteria of a natural functioning state. 
While I do agree with that perspective of the “Islamic 
State” as a somewhat functioning state, an air campaign 
against the Sunni populace would seem very similar to the 
search-and-destroy operations conducted by the US gov-
ernment during the Vietnam War. It’s amazing that after 
14 years of counterinsurgency fighting, we still believe that 
a war of attrition is a viable strategy for addressing this 
particular insurgency. 
Finally, why should we care? Why is all of this important? 
I would like to propose four concerns about ISIS that I 
think make it extremely relevant. First, the terrorist acts of 
9/11, executed by individuals trained during the 1990s and 
2000s, were the product of Salafi-jihadist upbringing and 
extremism that was fostered in obscure locations across 
the Muslim world. If we continue to allow a generation 
of young Iraqis and Syrians to grow up under that same 
ideology, what fruits of terrorism will that bear for the 
next generation? Second, although ISIS isn’t likely to ever 
create a spectacular domestic terror event like 9/11, their 
business model of employing homegrown terrorism in 
lieu of pulling individuals into training camps to develop 
attacks is harder to defend than al Qaeda’s previous 
strategy. Third, a fractured Iraq, I believe, further desta-
bilizes the Middle East, increases Iranian influence and 
opportunity, and perhaps furthers the goal of establishing 
Hezbollah 2.0 in Iraq. This, again, forces the other Sunni 
states within the region to counterbalance [the increase in 
Iranian and Shi’a power]. 
Fourth, I believe ISIS is a significant threat to our largest 
overseas military operation right now—Afghanistan. 
ISIS’s growth there has been frequently dismissed as a 
rebranding of Taliban forces who are 
disenfranchised. For that, I would offer 
an analogy from the 1990s. There was 
an organization that was somewhat 
fractured and stagnant in that there 
were many Pashtuns who were disen-
franchised within it. A small upstart 
group in southern Afghanistan changed 
a flag, rebranded itself, and was able to 
become wildly successful over the next 
five years. Of course, that organization 
is the Taliban. So breathing new life into an organization 
with an ideological change and a new arm patch has been 
effective in the past. 
QUESTION: How do we defeat ISIS in the realm they 
dominate—information operations—particularly in the 
cyber domain?
INGRAM: ISIS excels at creating a perception of a global 
conflict, whereas the heart of the conflict, in fact, is 
in Muslim lands. Information operations, the media 
campaign, propaganda, whatever you want to call it, have 
a central, strategic role in insurgency thinking. Why? 
Because it is all about creating perceptions. It’s about 
leveraging political and military actions in the field, along 
with messaging to influence the perceptions of contested 
populations. Contested populations include potential 
supporters but also enemies. It’s very, very difficult to 
describe ISIS’s information operations. The sheer breadth 
of their campaign is immense, from local audiences to 
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broader regional and transnational ones. If we look at 
their means of communication, these are as varied as local-
area pamphlets, billboards, and speakers who [put up a 
screen and] hold movie nights, to transnational efforts, 
such as a magazine that is disseminated online. 
My assessment is that in the “perceptions war,” it is very 
difficult to deny that we are getting beaten. I suspect that 
the roots of this lie in an intellectual failing. I think that 
American commentary on and analysis of the ISIS infor-
mation operations campaign—but even before that with 
al Qaeda and with other asymmetrical combatants—has 
tended to be very, very narrow. There is a kind of cognitive 
bias that has infiltrated our analysis of these problems. In 
the last year there have been a lot of publications about 
ISIS that focus on four factors or threats. 
One such focus addresses ISIS’s central 
media units. The problem with that 
myopic focus is that ISIS actually has 
a multitiered organizational structure 
that is responsible for its media efforts. 
So yes, you do have those central media 
units like al Hayat and al Furqān. How-
ever, the most active producer of official 
ISIS information operations material 
is, in fact, at the secondary level, and 
it’s run by the wilayet [provincial] information officers. 
They are actually the most prolific producers. And then, 
of course, you have this more influential means of IO 
dissemination, the unofficial production, which some 
people call the “fan boys.” The “fan boys” use social 
media to disseminate these messages. 
The second popular focus is on how ISIS uses social media 
as a means of communication for its target audiences. I 
fear that this focus has resulted in confusion about the 
means of communication and the meaning of commu-
nication. A corollary to this is that the way we develop 
metrics for success have become warped. I don’t know 
whether you are aware of the “Think Again, Turn Away” 
campaign and the sarcastic “Run to ISIS-land” video 
that was produced by the State Department? Well, there 
were mixed reviews on the effectiveness of these, but one 
of the defenses to that criticism said, “Well, look how 
many tweets we got. Hundreds of thousands of tweets 
on this! It was getting out there, it was being retweeted.” 
In actuality it was being retweeted by the ISIS fan boys. 
They were retweeting it because they thought it was funny. 
They were mocking it. Here is something that should be 
really clear to everybody: if your enemy is disseminating 
your IO for you, you probably shouldn’t think it’s effective. 
The third point I want to highlight is this myopic focus 
on ISIS’s violence. You know, there is almost a hypnotic 
obsession with violence, and ISIS makes its videos to 
achieve precisely that. They want you to be hypnotized 
by the blood falling into a trench and flowing down. The 
problem with that focus is that we lose sight of its broader 
messaging. ISIS has extraordinarily diverse messaging, not 
only to its local audiences—its full spectrum of messaging 
is very, very diverse. I suspect that when we myopically 
focus on violence, we lose sight of that much broader 
picture, and we fall victim [to our emotions]: we end up 
driven by this rage, and we respond to violence rather than 
what we should be doing, which is soberly looking at things 
and analytically trying to understand what’s going on. 
The fourth point is this fixation on 
production. As if it was production 
that makes a difference in the efficacy 
of the product. There are commenta-
tors on CNN, on Fox, or whatever else, 
and they will mock the latest issue of 
Inspire [al Qaeda’s magazine] and say 
how it’s much less slick than Dabiq [the 
ISIS magazine]. Slick production is the 
glossy package that obscures what’s more 
important, and that is the ISIS message. 
From Mao to the Islamic State
INGRAM: There is no big single factor that sets ISIS 
information operations apart from its predecessors or its 
contemporaries. Those core, fundamental mechanics of 
ISIS’s information campaign are broadly similar to the 
basic tenets of how Mao Zedong and [North Vietnamese 
General Vo Nguyen] Giap and all these other guys spoke 
about how propaganda should actually be used. Messages 
should be used essentially to check the perceptions and to 
polarize the support of contested populations. The way 
you do that is by leveraging two sets of factors. The first 
set is the one I call pragmatic factors, which are tied to 
security, stability, and livelihood. ISIS messaging tries to 
convince the population that “we” have the most effective 
competitive system of control. And not only do we have 
the most competitive system of control, if we tell you that 
we are going to do something, we are going to do it.
The second set of factors, which I think are very impor-
tant but which tend to be over-emphasized at times, are 
perceptual factors. Perceptual factors essentially relate to 
the cause, which is a very broad, abstract way of putting 
it. But this messaging plays on identity–crisis–solution 
constructs. For ISIS there is a very simple narrative: we 
IN THE “PERCEPTIONS 
WAR,” IT IS VERY 
DIFFICULT TO DENY 




are the champions of Sunni Muslims. Our enemies are malevolent, oppressive 
groups that are responsible for your crisis. So join us to defeat them, because we 
have the solutions. Regarding the core narrative, ISIS will actually interplay those 
different kinds of constructs. So they will put out some messaging, which I call 
“value reinforcing,” that will say that ISIS has the solutions and all their enemies 
are causing crises. They have their economic reinforcement messages that will 
actually say: compare us, compare how good we are, to how bad and malevolent 
our enemies are. 
ISIS has demonstrated a real appreciation for the fact that different audiences 
require different messaging. So ISIS information campaigns have tended to stress 
pragmatic factors, what I would call rational choice appeals, about making a de-
cision between what’s effective and what’s ineffective. What is going to keep you 
safe, and what is not going to keep you safe. What is going to get you killed and 
your wife and children raped, and what will allow you to live a relatively happy 
life. To transnational audiences, ISIS has tended to prioritize those perceptual 
things. Read Dabiq or watch ISIS videos, and you will see that proportionally, 
comparatively, there is a greater emphasis on perceptual factors and nefariously 
playing on that core narrative. 
However, even though ISIS messaging tends to stress certain things to certain 
audiences, it is actually when you compare that messaging to the messaging 
of al Qaeda Central, or al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and other Islamist 
groups, that you start to see the really subtle differences in the way that ISIS 
appeals to contested populations. The hallmark of an ISIS information campaign 
is its ability to interweave identity and rational choice appeals, and in doing 
so, to align those two crucial types of decision-making processes—rational and 
identity choice. We really struggle to try to understand why it is that foreign 
fighters have made the decision to go overseas so rapidly. What is it that has 
made these lone wolves decide to act so quickly? I think it is because the narra-
tive is so well constructed. While narrative doesn’t explain everything, I think 
it gives us a pretty good insight because ISIS information campaigns interweave 
these identity and rational choice appeals almost seamlessly. I leave you with this 
question: what is our narrative? ²
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3  This interview was edited for length and clarity. Every effort 
was made to ensure that the meaning and intention of the 
participants were not altered in any way. The ideas and opinions 
of all participants are theirs alone and do not represent the 
official positions of the US Naval Postgraduate School, the US 
Department of Defense, the US government, or any other official 
entity.
4 The Awakening refers to the Anbar Awakening or Sahwa 
movement—the 2007 Sunni uprising against the ISI on the Syrian 
border.
5  Abu Omar, as quoted in a speech by Abu Muhammad al-
Adnani, “The State of Islam Will Remain Safe,” 7 August 
2011, 4: http://triceratops.brynmawr.edu/dspace/bitstream/
handle/10066/15267/ADN20110807.pdf ?sequence=1
6 Mao Zedong led the insurgent Chinese Red Army to victory 
against extreme odds in 1949. Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin was an 
early al Qaeda commander who fought against the Soviets in 
Afghanistan. Abu Bakr Naji is almost certainly a pseudonym 
for one or more Salafist extremists whose writing has influenced 
al Qaeda and ISIS. Abu Musab al-Suri (the pen name for 
al Qaeda strategist Mustafa Setmariam Nasar) wrote a major 
treatise in 2005 on the strategy to achieve global jihad.
7 Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (Lanham, 
Md.: University Press of America, 1982).
8  This refers to Zarqawi’s failed first attempt to establish a terror 
cell in Germany in 2002. For more information, see Matthew 
Levitt, “USA Ties Terrorist Attacks in Iraq to Extensive Zarqawi 
Network,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 April 
2004: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/
usa-ties-terrorist-attacks-in-iraq-to-extensive-zarqawi-network
9  Karl Rove served as President George W. Bush’s senior political 
advisor and deputy chief of staff between 2001 and Rove’s 
resignation in 2007. 
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The news is full of the daily horrors that are tearing Syria 
and Iraq apart. The recent involvement of Russia is just one more twist in this 
story. Hundreds of thousands of Syrians are fleeing not only the Bashar al-Assad 
regime, but also the self-styled Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). From 
reports of its rivalry with al Qaeda (AQ) for the allegiance of other jihadis, to 
the declaration of a caliphate, to the rise in terrorist acts around the world by 
individuals or groups claiming affiliation with or inspiration from ISIS, the group 
seems ubiquitous in the headlines of the world’s newspapers.
For a non-specialist, following the rise and fall of the various factions and 
splinter groups, the changing loyalties, and the internal disputes that have helped 
create ISIS as it is today can be as bewildering as any TV soap opera to a first-time 
viewer. In ISIS: The State of Terror, Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger provide a 
simple and timely “Who’s Who” of major ISIS players; an overview of the group’s 
origins, goals, and methods; and an analysis of what makes ISIS unique on the 
jihadi scene. The clarity that Stern and Berger bring to this murky subject makes 
this book a must-read for anyone interested in the modern Middle East and 
jihadist terrorism. Dr. Stern is the author of several books related to religious 
militants and terrorists, including Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious 
Militants Kill (Harper, 2004). She is a lecturer on terrorism at Harvard Univer-
sity and served on US President Bill Clinton’s National Security Council staff 
(1994–1995). J. M. Berger is the author of Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in 
the Name of Islam (Potomac Books, 2011) and is a non-resident fellow with the 
Brookings Institution.
Stern and Berger begin by describing the original incarnation of ISIS, Al Qaeda 
in Iraq (AQI). Given the prevailing assessment by some television “talking heads” 
that the departure of US combat troops from Iraq in 2011 led directly to the rise 
of ISIS, the authors’ more nuanced take is refreshing. They point instead to the 
2003 US invasion of Iraq, along with the “de-Ba’athification” of government 
and military ranks (largely Sunnis), as the true sources of Sunni discontent and 
the rise of AQI. The US troop surge of 2006–2007 briefly calmed sectarian fears 
and helped bring about the “Sunni Awakening.” This period also saw the death 
of AQI leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and the organization’s name change to the 
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), although the group remained aligned with the less 
brutally violent al Qaeda Central. Stern and Berger go on to demonstrate how 
the increased sectarianism of the Iraqi government after the 2010 elections, along 
with the Arab Spring uprisings—particularly in Syria, with the formation of ISI 
affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra—and the departure of US combat troops, fueled Sunni 
fears and the spread of ISI, and led to the eventual merger in 2013 of ISI and 
Jabhat al Nusra as ISIS under the leadership of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. 
Having established this background, Stern and Berger delve into the central 
theme of the book: how and why ISIS is not “just your dad’s al Qaeda.”1 The 
differences in methods and means between al Qaeda and ISIS mark an important 
shift in approach for the modern jihadi movement. The authors highlight three 
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primary, mutually reinforcing distinctions: the message, 
the recruitment targets, and the use of social media. They 
discuss these broad subjects along with closely linked topics 
such as the use of “electronic brigades” and psychological 
warfare. In one example, Stern and Berger describe ISIS’s use 
of a Twitter app called “The Dawn of Glad Tidings,” which 
includes a “computer code that could take control of a con-
senting user’s account to automatically send out tweets.”2 
This is not new technology, but ISIS has excelled at using 
Twitter strategically: “ISIS had a name for these [Twitter] 
users—the mujtahidun (industrious). The mujtahidun 
could be observed repeatedly using specific tactics to boost 
the organization’s reach and exposure online.”3 This section 
of the book, about the ways ISIS has changed the message, 
the methods it uses to disseminate that message, and the 
individuals and groups with which that message resonates, 
was particularly compelling—and alarming.
Stern and Berger contrast the messaging of al Qaeda and 
ISIS, pointing out that AQ retains the older jihadi focus 
on Muslims as being in a position of 
weakness—the perspective, in other 
words, that jihad is an act of defense. 
This message was typically supported 
by lengthy ideological papers and static 
“talking head” videos, along with the 
occasional action video showing AQ 
soldiers training in a desert or blowing 
up “asymmetrical targets” (because AQ 
leaders did not view direct combat as a 
current possibility). 
ISIS, in contrast, projects a much 
more active, successful, and violent vision of jihad. The 
Clanging of the Swords movie series, produced by ISIS’s 
media outlet, is emblematic of this transition. The films 
are a higher-quality and more aggressive portrayal of ISIS 
fighters’ strength and ability to win in direct combat.4 
This new approach also promotes the vision of an Islamic 
“utopia” in the here and now, which is an important part 
of the group’s appeal to new audiences for whom the 
more muted AQ message does not resonate. The notable 
violence of ISIS’s current messaging, in both nature and 
transmission, appears to have been largely influenced by 
the writings of jihadi strategist Abu Bakr Naji. In Naji’s 
view, a lesson learned from previous failed jihads is the 
need for a phase of “highly visible violence, intended to 
send a message to both allies and enemies.”5 ISIS has taken 
that lesson to heart.
Not only does ISIS offer a different message from that of 
al Qaeda, its target audience is also significantly different. 
Like AQ, ISIS primarily woos foreign fighters, but unlike 
AQ, it also invites women, families, and even foreign 
professionals to join the hirja (emigration). This broad 
recruitment pool is directly linked to the group’s dual 
goals: not only to reestablish the caliphate, but also to 
create a state and society of like-minded Muslims. ISIS is 
actively appealing to a wide range of internal and external 
motivations, making it much more difficult for Western 
CT analysts to typify ISIS’s foreign fighters. Stern and 
Berger also lament ISIS’s use of children to carry out 
their atrocities, noting that people, especially children, 
who are inundated with violence and death tend to lose 
their empathy and respect for human life. As a result, the 
world is faced with a significant challenge as countries 
consider the reintegration of both returning and liber-
ated ISIS fighters. Moreover, ISIS has a message for those 
“left behind,” sympathizers who are unable for whatever 
reason to travel to Syria or Iraq but might be willing to act 
at home. This message of encouragement to “lone wolf ” 
jihadis has allegedly provoked a number of incidents in 
Western countries, raising fear among Western popula-
tions and heightening the psychological 
warfare factor. 
In later chapters, Stern and Berger 
highlight ISIS’s innovative use of social 
media. Whereas AQ is much more 
likely to produce a long-winded video 
monologue revolving around a theo-
logical point, ISIS has turned to Twitter, 
Facebook, and YouTube to share 
“victories,” such as hostage beheadings, 
interspersed with happy images of jihadi 
family life in ISIS territory. This use of 
media technology and brand marketing takes advantage 
of Western countries’ protection of free speech, which 
raises interesting (and troubling) questions about the 
circumstances under which messages can, or should, be 
designated as “terrorist” and shut off. Is it better to shut 
down terrorist accounts or leave them up for intelligence 
purposes? Who should be in charge of making such 
decisions: governments or the corporations that own the 
social media sites? Social media helps spread the organiza-
tion’s message of strength and victory, not only to the 
world at large, but also to its rivals in al Qaeda. 
Stern and Berger make it clear that realistic military 
options against ISIS are limited, and unlikely to do more 
than degrade its fighting capacity and perhaps contain its 
growth. They offer two principal prescriptions: counter 
the black-and-white jihadi message by “fleshing out the 
nuance and complexity of situations and conditions” 
in vulnerable communities; and design policies that do 
not “lend credence and support to ISIS’s simplistic and 








apocalyptic worldview.”6 The first prescription, however, 
seems to contradict a discussion earlier in the book 
regarding the generally limited ability of vulnerable 
populations to process nuance. This in turn suggests 
that, somehow, ISIS’s opponents first have to increase a 
group’s (or society’s) capacity for critical thinking, and 
only then can they engage in discussions 
of specific “situations and conditions.” 
This makes the task much more com-
plicated than the authors imply in their 
recommendation. 
The second prescription appears, on 
the surface, easier to accomplish. States 
simply need to avoid overreacting 
to atrocities committed by ISIS and 
playing into the jihadis’ narrative. This 
would, however, require that democratic governments be 
willing—and able—to resist public pressure for imme-
diate action following acts of savagery and violence, or 
the repercussions of terrorist violence elsewhere, such as 
a massive influx of refugees. This recommendation also 
relies heavily on the Western media and how they report 
the ISIS “story.” Stern and Berger focus more on “control” 
of the social-media battlefield rather than the role of social 
media per se, but they also acknowledge the minefield of 
legal and moral obstacles that lie along the boundaries of 
free speech, private business, intelligence, and the actual 
terrorists who are using social media. They rightfully 
point out that the West “owns the battlefield” of social 
media, and if that power is used correctly in this war of 
ideas and messages, we will have an indisputable advan-
tage in our confrontation with ISIS. 
In their conclusion, Stern and Berger seem uncertain 
whether there is anything to do beyond containing the 
virus that is ISIS. And while they clearly oppose any full-
scale military response, each of their recommendations for 
containing ISIS seems to come with a caveat, which makes 
their ideas less useful for real planning or action. Their 
analysis of a proposal to cancel the online accounts of 
anyone distributing terrorist content provides an example 
of the complications for democratic societies. The authors 
warn that such a policy can lead to “chronic framing 
problem[s]. Advocates of free speech see it as a censorship 
issue, as do some social media companies.”7 Later, Stern 
and Berger point out that, while “additional study is 
necessary to fully evaluate the impact of such suppression 
techniques [as suspending accounts], the early data is very 
encouraging. … That said, it is not so 
easy to implement a policy of suppres-
sion.”8 The authors’ framing of the 
problems in countering ISIS is excellent, 
but deriving actionable policies from 
their discussion is less easy.  
Overall, however, ISIS: The State of 
Terror is an interesting and quick read. 
The authors do an excellent job of laying 
out ISIS’s history, tactics, and techniques, 
and the ways in which ISIS differs from previous jihadi 
movements like AQ. Stern and Berger intersperse their dis-
cussion of ISIS’s messaging, recruitment strategies, and use 
of social media with descriptions of the methods Western 
states have used successfully to degrade some of these 
efforts. It is also satisfying to catch a glimpse of the internal 
jihadi fitna (infighting)—which shows that ISIS and its 
leadership are not unanimously supported even within the 
jihadi community.
Stern and Berger bring clarity and perspective to the 
threat we are facing—a threat that is not an existential 
one. Despite the lack of innovative policy recommenda-
tions, ISIS: The State of Terror helps to provide context 
for the recent events in Syria and Iraq, as well as their 
impact on the world at large. Anyone who is interested 
in, but unfamiliar with, violent religious extremism and 
the evolving situation in the Middle East will find value in 
this insightful book.  ²
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Countering Violent Extremism in Mali  
by Mark Moyar
Dr. Moyar analyzes US and international efforts to counter Mali’s panoply of 
extremist organizations. Violent opposition to Mali’s government has deep 
roots, which include historic tensions between the Tuaregs and other ethnic 
groups, as well as the emergence of Salafist extremist groups in Algeria. Extremist 
attacks on Mali’s democratic government in late 2011 and early 2012 culminated 
in a military coup that allowed rebels to take control of northern Mali. Because 
Mali had received extensive military and non-military assistance from the 
United States and other foreign countries in the preceding years, these disasters 
led some to question aid practices, including those of United States Special 
Operations Forces (USSOF). This study adds to a growing body of knowledge 
on special operations and counterterrorism in Africa. It also contributes to the 
general understanding of the troubling events in Mali, where the government 
continues to confront violent extremism and other forms of rebellion. Perhaps 
most significantly for USSOF, the monograph offers insights into the building of 
partner capacity.
These recent JSOU Press publications are available electronically in the JSOU Library Management System: 
https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications
Tactical Operations for Strategic Effect:  The Challenge of Currency 
Conversion  
by Colin S. Gray
Dr. Gray examines the currency conversion between tactical behavior and its 
strategic consequences. All strategy consists of tactical actions, and Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) are often tasked with tactical operations with the 
expectation that the actions will have the desired strategic effect. A SOF com-
munity seeking to explain its functions needs to be crystal clear in distinguishing 
between the fundamental meanings of strategy and tactics. If there is confusion 
about these two concepts—and the author believes there is—then charting a 
sensible relationship between them is impossible. The author explains, for ex-
ample, that “there are no, indeed there cannot be, any ‘strategic’ troops, forces, or 
weapons, for the simple reason that all troops, forces, and weapons have strategic 
meaning, be it ever so slight, or even arguable.” This monograph attempts to 
reinforce the understanding of strategy and tactics by using historical examples 
of where the two have failed each other. In the end, there must be the necessary 
direction and leadership that provides solid strategic sense, so that SOF may 
achieve the effects needed to advance US policy.




Sun Tzu and Machiavelli in Syria: Attacking Alliances  
by Richard Rubright
The purpose of this short work is to contextualize the ongoing conflict in Syria 
through the combined lens of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, juxtaposed to the 
normative trend the West has followed so ineffectually since the Syrian conflict 
began. This work is an alternative view of the conflict that should be read as a 
cautionary tale concerning our lack of proficiency in strategy. It is broken down 
into three distinct parts. The first part contextualizes the conflict and the actors 
involved, including the proxies. The second part lays out the strategic principles 
of Sun Tzu as they pertain to the conflict, to provide a strategic framework 
to help the reader make sense of the conflict’s complex nature. The final part 
focuses on US action in the Syrian conflict, keeping in mind Machiavelli and 
as informed by Sun Tzu’s strategic principles. Dr. Rubright is a senior faculty 
member at the Joint Special Operations University and teaches in the fields of 
special operations, strategy, and counterinsurgency.
Maskirovka 2.0: Hybrid Threat, Hybrid Response  
by James Q. Roberts
In this paper, Mr. Roberts describes the irregular and hybrid tools and techniques 
that Russian President Vladimir Putin, his security forces, and his intelligence 
forces have used, first in the attack against Georgia in 2008, then in the assault 
on Ukraine, and now in Syria, to advance renewed Russian regional hegemony 
and strategic reach. The paper also describes the mobilization of Russian mi-
nority populations, the cooptation of the Georgian and Ukrainian regimes, and 
the West’s seeming inability to effectively counter these Russian moves. Since 
this paper was finalized for publication, Russia moved into Syria and the assess-
ment of this adventure remains very speculative. Nevertheless, many aspects of 
the Syrian case are fully congruent with Russia’s hybrid approach in Georgia and 
Ukraine. Mr. Roberts holds the Office of the Secretary of Defense chair at the 
Eisenhower School, National Defense University. His prior assignment was as 
the principal director, Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, Office of 
the Secretary of Defense.
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The Collapse of Iraq and Syria: The End of the Colonial Construct 
in the Greater Levant  
by Roby C. Barrett
A day does not go by without something about Iraq and Syria, as well as the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), in the news. Most of the news coverage deals 
with atrocities, factionalism, civil war, and cultural/ethnic strife. The value of 
this monograph is that Dr. Roby Barrett delves expertly and deeply into history 
to explain this complicated story. It is a story of states created with artificial 
borders, which had to be ruled with iron fists to keep a lid on fractured societies. 
Barrett explains that what we are witnessing is the dissolution of these borders and 
the collapse of central governments in Iraq and Syria. In fact, the author contends 
that Iraq and Syria no longer exist as nation-states, but that their ultimate fate is 
yet to be seen. This monograph provides the reader with a historical overview of 
the Greater Levant that helps explain the reality on the ground today.
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debate, we will not reject submissions outright simply because of poorly 
written English. However, we may ask you to have your submission re-
edited before submitting again.
Ready to Submit?
By making a submission to CTX, you are acknowledging that your submis-
sion adheres to all of the submission requirements listed above, and that 
you agree to the CTX Terms of Copyright, so read them carefully.
Submit to 
CTXSubmit@GlobalECCO.org
If you have questions about submissions, or anything else, contact 
CTXEditor@GlobalECCO.org
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